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Abstract
This study examines the theme of ‘hope’ in an ethical end to History as expressed 
by Sartre in his final thoughts in the dialogue Hope Now shortly before his death. It 
first examines in detail Sartre’s thinking in the controversial text of Hope Now and 
then proceeds through a close examination of two relatively neglected texts from 
the two major periods of Sartre’s work. These are the Cahiers of the late 1940s 
and his lecture notes for his undelivered talk at Cornell University in the mid-60s 
entitled ‘Morality and History’. The aim is to establish the development of Sartre’s 
thinking concerning the relationship between ethics and history and ultimately to 
consider how far his final ‘hope’ in an ethical ‘end’ to history can be justified in 
terms of his own thinking. A secondary aim is to provide the basis for a reconsid-
eration of the status of Hope Now within the overall context of his thinking. What 
emerges from Sartre’s texts considered here is a subtle and complex relationship 
between ethics and history which well exemplify Sartre’s great merits as an ethical 
thinker. The study concludes that there is indeed genuine scope for ‘hope’ within 
his thought and that his views in Hope Now are plausibly and illuminatingly related 
to the ground he had already covered in his search for an ethics. 
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Introduction
This study begins at the end in that it starts with Sartre’s last recorded 
thoughts before his death in 1980. These thoughts take the form of a record of his 
conversations with his ‘secretary’, Benny Levy. Levy was a former radical from the 
protests of ’68 with whom Sartre had collaborated in the ‘70s. Levy had since re-
pudiated his radicalism and re-discovered his roots in Judaism. Sartre was almost 
completely blind and in very poor health yet he continued to work with Levy acting 
as his amanuensis.  Indeed, in the text Sartre talks of embarking on a new philo1 -
sophical project in the time that remains to him of developing a ‘third ethics’, the 
beginnings of which emerge in the discussions. The publication of a section of 
these discussions, edited by Levy but corrected by Sartre, as ‘L’Espoir Maintenant 
(Hope Now)’ caused great controversy among Sartre’s circle. Many considered 
that an enfeebled Sartre had been manipulated into outright contradictions and re-
pudiations of the basic philosophical positions that defined his thought. The validity 
of this judgement is something that the study seeks to address. 
 There is a wider aim which is to use what is, initially at least, a vague no-
tion of ‘hope’ as a unifying theme for a close analysis of three texts which are 
each, in their own way, relatively neglected in the academic literature in english. 
We start with Hope Now which, perhaps precisely because of the controversy sur-
rounding it, has not received the detailed attention it deserves. Once we have es-
tablished, at least provisionally, what Sartre seems to mean by ‘hope’ at the end of 
 For a helpful summary of the background to the text see Aronson’s introduction in Hope 1
Now, trans. Van Den Hoven (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996)
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his life we can then follow the trail back into two texts. One from the period 
1947/48 - Cahiers pour Une Morale (Notebooks for an Ethics) - and the other from 
the period 1964/65 - Morale et Histoire (Morality and History). Of course the Note-
books have been discussed in a variety of contexts, often very perceptively, but, 
as might be expected of such a long, diffuse and unfinished text, it tends to get 
picked over as a kind of ‘treasure trove’ to suit a particular focus. Indeed, as far as 
this writer is aware, there still remains only one book length treatment of the text in 
English by Gail Linsenbard.  Whilst her discussion has many merits she tends to 2
read it back into Being and Nothingness rather than forward into the Critique. This 
risks losing the real richness and significance of the text. 
The final text considered in this study is the transcript of Sartre’s notes for a 
lecture to be given at Cornell University in the USA in 1965. Sartre withdrew from 
this commitment at the last minute because of the escalation of US involvement in 
Vietnam. The text was worked up and corrected by Sartre up to the point that he 
withdrew from the lecture. It therefore has a coherence and structure which is not 
always the case with Sartre’s unpublished texts. The notes were published in 
French in Les Temps Modernes as ‘Morale et Histoire’ in 2005 but there exists no 
English translation of the entire text although a small portion of the first section has 
been translated by Elizabeth Bowman.  Again, therefore, this text has received 3
relatively little detailed discussion in English and for that reason it is worth attempt-
ing a detailed treatment here. Moreover, the text itself relates to a key period in 
Sartre’s ethical thinking linked to the ontology of the Critique and the lecture that 
Sartre gave in Rome to an audience of ‘Euro-Communists’ at the Gramsci Institute 
in 1964. Alongside the notes for that latter lecture there also exist over 500 pages 
of manuscript which represent Sartre’s work on Ethics in the period of the early-
mid 60s. Only a few pages of this other material have so far been published but 
taken collectively they form the basis of what is often referred to as Sartre’s ‘Di-
alectical Ethics’.  In the context of this study a major part of the interest of ‘Morality 4
and History’ lies in its intended audience. One must at the very least suppose that 
Sartre adapted his discussion to the intended audience - the students and faculty 
 G. Linsenbard, An Investigation into Sartre’s Posthumously Published Notebooks for an 2
Ethics (Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press 2000)
 See R. Aronson and A. Van Den Hoven,  (eds.), Sartre Alive (Detroit: Wayne State Uni3 -
versity Press 1991) pp. 37-52
 For a helpful overview of Sartre’s ethical writings of this period see T. R. Flynn, Sartre, A 4
Philosophical Biography (Cambridge: CUP 2014) pp. 355-381
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of Cornell University rather than a group of European Communists! One effect of 
this is to allow Sartre’s thinking about the ethical dimensions of praxis to emerge in 
interesting ways - the same ground is covered in one respect but with a certain 
kind of clarity. For this reason too, the text merits close study. 
Overall then this study is unashamedly based on a close examination of 
these three relatively neglected texts. We will follow the twists and turns of his writ-
ing on ethics from these key periods of the development of his thinking with the 
aim of discovering what content we can give to ‘hope’ itself. 
Hope Now - 1980
Sartre’s initial claim in the discussion is that ‘everyone lives with hope,’ and 
that, ‘hope is part of man.’  This is because of the temporal structure of human ac5 -
tion where the past and the present situation is surpassed in an attempt to realise 
a future. The end is realised in the future and therefore, ‘hope is in the way man 
acts.’ This in itself might seem disarmingly simple and ‘hope’ a vague and naive 
attitude from which to act. But it is the attempt to work through the details of the 
relationship between the inertia of the past, the situated freedom of the present 
and the potential openness of the future that is the core theme of Sartre’s work. 
This attempt takes on a rich complexity and is characterised by a deep honesty as 
Sartre develops his thinking beyond the ontological isolation of the absolutely free 
consciousness of his earlier writings towards an individual necessarily situated in a 
wider collective context against the background of a shared history and society. 
The question essentially became, ‘what can we be?’ in such a situation and under-
lying it is the question of what we ought to be. This fundamental ethical theme is 
entwined with the ontological and existential situation within which it must be de-
veloped. So situation, society, action, temporality and history are what need to be 
understood and this is the basis of a ‘concrete’ ethics. The issue that concerns us 
here is whether ‘hope’ is where this ethical theme leads.
 J. P. Sartre and B. Levy, Hope Now, trans. A. Van Den Hoven (Chicago: University of 5
Chicago Press 1996) p.53
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Sartre tells us that he originally ‘saw despair merely as a lucid view of the 
human condition’, and that ‘despair’ is simply the recognition that our most basic 
projects of self-justification are condemned to failure.  This is the ‘useless passion’ 6
of Being and Nothingness, where we can never fully be what we aim to be in the 
sense of establishing a fixed, solid, justified essence for ourselves; but despair ‘is 
not the opposite of hope.’ Despair is awareness of failure at the most fundamental 
level, the ontological impossibility of the realisation of our most constitutive ends. 
Certainly the evolution of the notion of ‘failure’ is an interesting feature of Sartre’s 
thought and Being and Nothingness is in many ways an analysis of ‘failure’. In the 
dialogue of Hope Now Sartre does correct Levy’s attribution to him of the thought 
that ‘all hope leads to disappointment’ by responding, ‘I didn’t say exactly that…I 
said that they never attained exactly what they had searched for.’  Hope, Sartre 7
says, developed ‘gradually and only later’, and it is, ‘one manner of grasping the 
goal I set myself, as something that can be realised.’ It is clear from what he goes 
on to say, in this respect at least, that the attitude towards the goal is essential to 
hope and that he still believes that behind all concrete and relative ends ‘everyone 
has a goal that I would call…transcendent or absolute.’  This then is a certain kind 8
of ‘original project’; the fundamental, constitutive choice which unites desires, 
choices and action into a meaningful, intelligible whole. Hope relates to this abso-
lute goal from which our actions derive their meaning. Yet failure still afflicts this 
absolute end adopted in hope and gives rise to, ‘a contradiction I’ve not yet re-
solved.’ This is because one potential conclusion from Sartre’s analysis of situated 
consciousness is that our ends and their realisation are mediated in such a way 
that ‘man’s life manifests itself as failure’.  Not only is there always a lack of coin9 -
cidence between existence and essence at the individual level -we can never fully 
be what we are in the classic existentialist sense - but our choices and actions are 
formed and realised in a natural and inter-subjective world which we do not con-
trol. The counterpoint to this ‘absolute pessimism’ is not a guarantee that the ends 
will be realised as they have been conceived but rather the necessary presence of 
hope ‘in the very nature of action.’ So this lies not outside the action but in the ac-
  ibid. p.546
 ibid. p.547
 ibid. p.568
 ibid. p.569
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tion itself because the action contains within it ‘a realisation of the goal posited as 
future.’  Hope is ‘the relation of man to his goal’ - even in failure. 10
It is hard to know what to do with this kind of hope as it stands. It is both 
everything and nothing and in so far as it is bound up with our conception of our 
fundamental ends it needs a context to give it content. Implicit in this is a recon-
sideration of our fundamental projects and a shift towards social and ethical con-
texts. It is as if we ask, ‘what kinds of projects are worthy of hope?’ This emerges 
from the discussion in the text of Sartre’s fundamental project as a writer. ‘This 
choice of choices’, Levy asks, ‘has it been a failure?’ Certainly from the perspec-
tive of Being and Nothingness it must have been. After revealingly shifting be-
tween different levels of failure and success the discussion settles on, ‘what distin-
guishes the desire for being of a cafe waiter…from Sartre’s desire for 
immortality?’. Sartre is quite prepared to admit that he is guilty of certain kinds of 
‘bad faith’ as we all are but his actual practice as a writer, ‘…was different. It was 
clean, it was ethical…’  It was ethical because it operated in ‘a modality other 11
than the primary modality of the spirit of seriousness.’  This ‘spirit of seriousness’ 12
is the assumption that there is a fixed, objective order of values that can ground 
and justify our existence and that we can absolve ourselves of the perpetual need 
to create who we are. The ethical modality is rooted in a different fundamental 
project and therefore a different orientation than that of the futile ‘desire to be’. 
Here ‘we stop wanting to have being as a goal, we no longer want to be God…
We’re looking for something else.’  This is the level of ‘Working toward society’, of 13
generosity and the ‘gift’ and also of hope. Here then is the ‘desire for society’ as 
the fundamental project or ‘the choice of choices’.
All this certainly represents an ‘escape from the dialectics of bad faith in Be-
ing and Nothingness’, as Levy puts it to Sartre. The shift to an ‘ethical modality’ 
does represent a kind of conversion that opens up a range of ethical possibilities. 
The core relationships are those between individuals situated within society and 
history but this demands a clear understanding of ‘society’ which Sartre refuses in 
Hope Now to identify with either liberal democracy or the kinds of socio-economic 
relationships described by Marx; ‘It’s an altogether different relationship among 
 ibid. p.5710
 ibid. p.5811
 ibid. p.5912
 ibid. p.5913
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men.’  It would have been easier if Marxism or some other theoretical framework 14
could have demonstrated ‘the meaning of history’  and have revealed ‘the true so-
cial ends of ethics’, but the failure in this respect of The Critique of Dialectical 
Reason demands that we ‘look somewhere quite else.’  What remains is the con-
nection between ethics, sociality and history. Sartre speaks of ‘a slow movement, 
in history, of man’s becoming conscious of his fellowman.’ This development of a 
fraternal consciousness is ultimately what will reveal the true meaning of the 
movement of history and ‘everything will assume its true value.’  This also is 15
hope, in progress. 
So the isolated individual of Being and Nothingness, trapped in bad faith, 
refusing to accept the potential and responsibility of its freedom, in necessary con-
flict with other freedoms, striving in futility to ground and justify itself as freedom 
becomes an agent that has shifted its fundamental project to work collectively and 
fraternally in society, within history, to realise ‘the true social ends of ethics.’ The 
ethical end is then to be found within society and the kind of humanity it makes 
possible. Ethics and politics overlap because it is ‘a question of finding a future for 
society.’  This is not something that can be achieved by isolated individuals, in16 -
stead, as Sartre says, ‘one must imagine a body of people who struggle as one.’  17
Such collective action for change brings together a number of key themes and in-
volves a theoretical understanding of not just the group but society as a whole and 
of social development within history. It also, of course, involves an evaluative di-
mension to determine and give meaning to the ends adopted and the form of hu-
manity we might strive to achieve. As Sartre says, if ‘society is to stop being the 
shitty mess it is…’, we must identify social forces that are ‘trying to move forward’. 
Sartre’s own experience well illustrates that this is not always easy! This leads us 
back again to the ‘end’ or meaning of history as a human enterprise and the notion 
of progress. In the context of a discussion of the failure of The Critique of Dialecti-
cal Reason to ground an ‘ultimate end’, Sartre talks about an understanding of 
progress as being ‘a series of failures’ that contain within them ‘something unfore-
seen and positive’.  Progress here is ‘partial, local’ and implicit in failure. This, 18
too, is hope.
 ibid. p.6014
 ibid. p.6115
 ibid. p.6516
 ibid. p.6517
 ibid. p.6618
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There is, however, another possibility for revealing an end towards which to 
strive and that is, as Sartre says, ‘via man’. Our ontological condition is such that, 
lacking a fixed, determined essence, what we are is up for grabs. We ‘are strug-
gling to establish human relations and arrive at a definition of what is human.’ For 
Sartre what counts is the form of the struggle ‘to live together like human beings.’ 
It is the struggle for a human definition that is ‘our effort and our end.’ The goal is 
to form a society in which the individuals and the collectives reflect this ‘complete’ 
humanity. Such humanity, Sartre claims, is beyond ‘humanism’ at least in the 
sense of ‘a certain way man has of admiring himself.’ Yet the active striving to-
wards a condition of complete humanity is quite clearly a humanism albeit one 
that, once ‘man truly and totally exists’, becomes simply ‘man’s way of being’ 
rather than a value.  Up to this point we are ‘submen’ and humanism is ‘the act of 19
thinking about the relationship of man to man’ on the basis of the potential ‘sub-
men’ possess to go beyond that condition. Sartre goes on to say that it is this po-
tential for complete human being that gives moral value to ‘submen’. ‘Ethics’, he 
says, ‘begins at exactly that point’. We, who exist as ‘submen’ cannot be used 
merely as means or ‘raw material’ for the achievement of the ultimate end of hu-
manity as complete human being. In reaching beyond our current condition 
‘through our best acts’ we begin to sketch out a ‘society of human beings’. Only 
these complete humans can realise humanism. For our part, ‘We experience hu-
manism only as what is best in us.’  Yet since we ‘prefigure’ these complete hu20 -
man beings and it is our acts that in some way will create the conditions for such 
beings given that we are the active basis for their potential existence - what we are 
and what we do matters. 
This is hardly a detailed prescription for the perfection of humanity but it 
does hint at the core ethical themes that had developed in Sartre’s work. Ethics is 
a creative project working with what we have towards a future in which we can be 
more than we are. It is not an individual project where all we seek is self-perfec-
tion; rather there is a mutual relationship between the individual and the collective. 
This mutuality is an aspect of human existence that Sartre had been working 
through in a variety of forms since he shifted his focus from the sovereign individ-
ual of earlier writings and ‘discovered society’. Discovering society is a matter of 
discovering other consciousnesses and it is the manner and context in which 
 ibid. p.6819
 ibid. p.6920
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these others are discovered that counts. Certainly other consciousnesses featured 
in Being and Nothingness but there they were encountered rather than discovered. 
They were limits and threats to the ‘For-itself’ as the ‘absolute upsurge’ of freedom 
in the world. The idiom was ultimately one of theft and possession where my free-
dom is utterly mine and yours yours. Closed and isolated in this way it was hard to 
see how an ethical dimension of the kind Sartre outlined in Hope Now could ever 
be experienced by such a consciousness. In one of the most powerful and signifi-
cant sections of Hope Now Sartre addresses precisely this issue.
Levy asks him what he now understands by ‘ethics’. He responds by refer-
ring to a ‘dimension of consciousness’ that he calls ‘obligation’.   Initially it is not 21
entirely clear exactly what this is supposed to be other than ‘a kind of requisition 
that goes beyond the real’ resulting in an aspect of consciousness that is ‘a kind of 
inner constraint’ which accompanies thought and action. ‘Any objective that con-
sciousness has,’ he says, ‘presents itself as something in the nature of a requisi-
tion.’ This aspect of consciousness is, he claims, ‘the beginning of ethics’. The 
awareness of ‘inner constraint’ is, then, the basic resource within consciousness 
upon which to build an ethics. Freedom is both constrained and justified by this 
constraint. Sartre responds to Levy by saying that a ‘mandated’ freedom is the 
same thing as a ‘requisitioned’ one - it is the requisition that supplies the mandate 
as if, in the end, the ethical constraint justifies and empowers our freedom. The 
issue is the nature and source of this ‘inner constraint’ and this is linked to a ques-
tion Sartre raises, ‘Where does one place ethics in the human consciousness?’22
This is not a question that can satisfactorily be answered from the perspec-
tive of an isolated consciousness whose only value can be their pure freedom. In 
this case everything is ethical in the sense that there is a value but, because the 
only value is the pure freedom of the For-itself or individual consciousness, it is 
also the case that nothing is ethical because there is nothing outside of that value 
to give it form or meaning. Sartre admits that in his early work he made the mis-
take of ‘looking for ethics in a consciousness that had no reciprocal, no other.’ But 
now, he says, his thinking has developed to the point that he believes that all that 
consciousness experiences is ‘necessarily linked to…the existence of another.’ At 
the core of its constitution, Sartre claims, consciousness is ‘simultaneously’ 
 ibid. p.6921
 ibid. p.7022
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awareness of itself, the other and its relationship with those others.  There is 23
therefore a resource available from the very ‘constitution-in-the-world’ of con-
sciousness itself for a rich and real ethical experience based on relationship and 
mutuality. This is, Sartre says, ‘ethical conscience’. Moreover, since we exist in a 
situation where other consciousnesses are continuously present not necessarily in 
person but in the networks of objects and meaning within which we live then, ‘the 
other is always there and is conditioning me’ and how one lives and how one re-
sponds to the presence of the other within the world in this sense is, Sartre 
says,’of an ethical nature’.  From this perspective - that of a consciousness that is 24
no longer isolated but mutual and reciprocal at its very core - everything is ethical 
or potentially so but not formless or meaningless because it no longer has to do 
with a single undifferentiated freedom within itself but with a multitude of freedoms 
all situated on a common ground. 
This commonality, mutuality and reciprocity is at the heart of the ethical 
theme as it develops in Sartre’s works and one key issue with it is how to engen-
der and sustain such commonality. Once again, it would have been useful if the 
structured movement of history could have solved the problem over time;  but that 
does not seem to be the case. For one thing freedom itself remains stubbornly ir-
reducible. Our mutual dependence might be a feature of our condition but for 
Sartre this dependence remains free. The constraints that appear within con-
sciousness in the experience of the presence of others described above must 
themselves be chosen and adopted freely. ‘What is surreal’, he says, ‘about this 
constraint is that it does not determine; it presents itself as a constraint, yet the 
choice is made freely.’ Furthermore, there are features of our social and material 25
situation, as Sartre so amply demonstrated in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, 
that act counter to the formation and endurance of common bonds. The human 
world is such that it is the product of an amalgam of successive rounds of human 
activity upon nature to meet our needs. This situated, purposive activity Sartre 
calls ‘praxis’. The action of human praxis upon the material world creates an envi-
ronment which is neither pure human agency nor pure, objective materiality. It is a 
product of the two which Sartre terms in the Critique, the ‘practico-inert’ field. Be-
ing at root human activity ordering and inscribing itself onto the material world, the 
 ibid. p.7123
 ibid. p.7124
 ibid. p.7225
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‘practico-inert’ has a range of significant features. First it has a tendency or a kind 
of agency of its own with the capacity to divert and distort our praxis; our ends and 
goals are actualised in the ‘practico-inert’ in ways we did not intend. Secondly, the 
‘practico-inert’ has the capacity to order and structure our relationships in certain 
ways that are not conducive to the kind of collective unity and common action 
Sartre believes is so necessary to the achievement of ‘complete human beings’. In 
this case our most direct relationship is not with each other but with the ‘practico-
inert’ structure as in the classic example of a line of individuals waiting for a bus. 
Thirdly, and finally for our purposes at this point, the ‘practico-inert’ is charac-
terised by what Sartre terms ‘scarcity’. There is the constant danger of there not 
being enough to go round whether that be seats on a bus or work or whatever. 
This feature raises the continual possibility that our relationships will be based on 
conflict and violence.
It is evident that if things are as Sartre had portrayed them to be in the Cri-
tique then the kind of collective, mutual action necessary to create the conditions 
for ‘complete humanity’ will be hard to effect. At the very least there would need to 
be a social, political and theoretical basis on which to act and some end in view. In 
a kind of recounting of his political disappointments in this next section of Hope 
Now Sartre bemoans the fact that ‘the unity of the left… is now shattered.’  What 26
was once a ‘great mass movement’ is now split into parties that lack a deeper, uni-
fying principle and people vote for them ‘without hope’ as one votes ‘for any other 
party’. The situation is no more encouraging when he considers ‘the insurrectional 
aspect of leftism’; that too lacks the capacity to effect real change. A demonstration 
might occur, people might march, there might be violence but it all ends by ‘every-
body running away and breaking windows.’  So what is it that makes ‘the very 27
idea of a great and total change, the idea of revolution, quite impossible.’  Sartre 28
believes that the answer lies in the absence any longer of ‘faith in a general politi-
cal and human principle’ upon which to act. However obscure or implicit, this prin-
ciple, Sartre believes, was the very identity of the left as a force for radical change 
up to the beginning of the twentieth century. This principle united a left that sub-
sumed and went beyond Marxism itself. The issue then is how to rediscover this 
principle as a basis for reviving the possibility of radical social change. This is one 
 ibid. p.7626
 ibid. p.7627
 ibid. p.7528
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of the sections of the dialogue where Levy makes significant contributions. He 
frames his questions to invite certain kinds of answers from Sartre but nonetheless 
the latter seems quite capable of maintaining his side of the discussion which now 
begins to revolve around the interlinked issues of ‘fraternity’, radicalism or insur-
gency and violence.
‘Fraternity’ as a term to refer to a unifying principle is a problematic one - as 
Sartre says, ‘It was never sufficiently developed…there’s something in the very 
idea of fraternity that prevents one from developing the principle.’  In terms of 29
Sartre’s ideas in the Critique, Fraternity has a close association with violence. A 
group with the kind of internal unity that might be called ‘fraternal’ forms in re-
sponse to a common threat and responds to that threat as one. The threat having 
passed, the bond is held together by also directing that external aggression back 
into the group itself to create what Sartre calls ‘Fraternity-Terror’. This ambiguous 
relationship with violence is a significant theme in his political and social thinking 
and features here in Hope Now. It arises in connection with the notion of ‘radical-
ism’. Radicalism here means direct action for change that seeks to realise its guid-
ing principle in the most complete way possible, the kind of revolutionary insur-
gency associated with the Sans Culottes and the ‘Journées' of the French Revolu-
tion or the students and their allies of ’68. This is a path that Levy himself has re-
pudiated but Sartre’s response is interesting. Radicalism in some form is still, he 
believes, an ‘essential element’ of the left. The real issue is what kind of ‘radical-
ism’ are we talking about here. An inflexible radicalism that sees itself as some ab-
solute end, Sartre seems to be saying, is ‘nonsense’. Because radical action oc-
curs ‘in the context of other actions that naturally are going to modify it’; radicalism 
must in turn ‘modify itself’ and ‘compromise’.  What counts, Sartre says, is that ‘it 30
is the intention that must be radical’ and this allows flexibility as to the means and 
does not imply a necessary hostility toward other individuals or groups. In this re-
spect then, there is an attempt here to avoid a necessary connection between rad-
ical fraternity and violence. This is not entirely convincing and nor is Sartre himself 
entirely convinced, ‘we will have to come back one day’, he says, ‘to fraternity-ter-
ror.’  31
 ibid.  p.7829
 ibid. pp. 79-8030
 ibid. p.8031
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As the dialogue continues it appears that by making a distinction between 
radicalism as ‘the intention itself’ and not the ‘goal as such’ it is possible for there 
to be different ‘truths’ within what would otherwise appear to be a movement ani-
mated by a ‘common goal’.  There is always the possibility of a lack of fundamen32 -
tal unity at the level of the way in which the goal of radical social change is intend-
ed as a fundamental project. There might be temporary unities and commonalities 
at the level of action as such but ‘little by little it becomes clear that they are pursu-
ing very different goals.’ In this sense then the necessary unity for a consistent and 
effective radicalism must come from a certain way of intending or of understanding 
the radical goal. As Levy says, ‘We’re looking instead for a real conjuncture of in-
tentions. To be radical, then, would be to pursue in a radical way the bringing to-
gether of scattered intentions to the point where they achieve an adequate unity.’ 
Sartre agrees, with the caveat, ‘insofar as that is possible.’33
The task becomes how to specify and grasp the correct, unifying under-
standing of the radical goal apart from the superficial unities based on ‘misunder-
standing’ that have frequently been a feature of radical social movements. Whilst 
as Sartre says, ‘seizing power was a historical end’ - in specific circumstances the 
‘historical moment’ gave rise to specific unities and specific actions - behind this 
lies the question, ‘what have insurgents or revolutionaries always had as their ul-
timate goal, the thing they wanted without being able to name it?’ Such a goal or 
such a radical intention of the goal, Sartre claims, ‘appears in history but doesn’t 
belong to history’.  This ‘transhistorical’ intention of radical change is what links 34
progressive social movements through time but is itself not something that is the 
product of the development of specific historical circumstances, although it is al-
ways present in them. It is the ‘obscure’ principle, not openly or consciously ‘articu-
lated’ that had given the left its unity and force as a common movement but had 
been lost as a feature of common action for change in a welter of parties and 
‘scattered intentions’. Articulating such a principle, in giving a definition and a con-
tent to ‘fraternity’ such that it would contain within it a genuine basis for common 
action, would be also to reanimate the left and progress towards ‘complete human-
ity’. It would also provide a means of moving from what Levy calls the ‘hot’ and the 
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‘cold’ sectors of society.  This is essentially raising again the problem of violence 35
with the ‘hot’ being the urgency for progressive change and the ‘cold’ being those 
elements and forces that remain indifferent or resistant to it. The problem is both 
how to transfer the heat from one sector to another - how to spread and actualise 
wider change - and how to maintain the heat in the progressive sector sufficiently 
to sustain the movement for change. Both of these problems might well be solved 
by violence with some of the obviously deleterious and distorting consequences to 
which history attests. It is not that Sartre himself adopts this idiom of hot and cold 
and Levy, as a kind of repentant radical, has his own agenda here; but in the con-
text in which Sartre is making his replies it is clear that the general problem was 
one of the central issues that continued to bother him until the end. Obviously if a 
wider, more inclusive, more flexible basis upon which to effect change could be 
found; if fraternity could be given real life as an idea and if it could animate and 
unify social and political movements that could then spread into society as a 
whole, all the while remaining radical or ‘hot’ in some sense, then this would in-
deed be something significant. 
So fraternity needs some articulation and it needs a connection with wider 
political action and movement. In the dialogue this is advanced by a discussion of 
democracy. As Sartre says we need to ‘take it as a whole and see what the rela-
tionship is between democracy and fraternity’. In the spirit of the preceding discus-
sion this is not a specific historical form of democracy, either direct or indirect, but 
one that is animated by the ‘primary principle’ of fraternity. This then is a wider 
conception that is not merely a legitimising mechanism that delegates power but ‘a 
life, a way of life.’  It is clear that Sartre differs from Levy here and the political 36
and conceptual gap between them is at its most acute. Sartre begins by pointing 
out the fact that politically democracy is no longer what it was originally intended to 
be - government by the people. This is because ‘the people’ no longer refers to a 
common body in modern democracies. Such a term can no longer describe our 
existence in industrial society where we are ‘entirely individuated by the division of 
labour.’  Without a common basis we relate to one another through a series of 37
mediations that keep us atomised and isolated. Modern democracy reflects the 
fragmentation of modern life where voting has ‘no connection with one’s work or 
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with the totality of one’s personal concerns.’  What is missing, he seems to feel, is 38
a connection between the political act and the whole of our lives as members of 
society. In this sense the vote at certain times in the past has been an expression 
of the totality of our existence. Levy then picks this up in an interesting way. In 
terms of his idiom of hot and cold, he wonders whether universal suffrage is one 
means of going from ‘the hot to the cold sector.’ It has, Levy says, ‘at least one 
merit - it points to a numerical unity, a complete series: it doesn’t conjure away the 
category of “everyone”.’ He challenges Sartre with the idea that the struggle for 
suffrage is exactly an example of the sort of ‘good’ radicalism that they have been 
discussing and that modern democracy is, in effect, the best means of giving 
‘more effective meaning to the notion of “everyone”.’  Sartre responds by pointing 39
out that such a series is precisely that - simply ‘everyone’ voting. What we have to 
ask is what kinds of deeper relationships would give the vote meaning. People, he 
says, ‘have an original relationship among themselves that exists prior to the vote.’ 
Their vote expresses a situated network, a ‘milieu’ within which they exist ‘along-
side others.’ 40
This is one of the most significant sections of the dialogue and touches on a 
central theme that runs through Sartre’s political and ethical thinking as it develops 
through the 1940s into the 1960s. At its core is, as Sartre says in the text, the ‘pri-
mary relationship of individual to individual.’  The focus of Sartre’s criticisms in 41
Search for a Method on the kind of ‘lazy Marxism’ that subsumes the individual 
within the social ‘totality’ and reifies that ‘totality’ as an inert, objectively analysable 
structure to which all action must conform is echoed here. Sartre denies that the 
‘relationship of production is the primary one’. Instead, Sartre is interested in a 
more fundamental praxis based in shared humanity rather than socio-economic 
relations as such. Indeed, he says significantly that a purely political understanding 
of society - one that interprets society in terms of the institutional relationships be-
tween ‘collectives’ defined purely by socio-economic interests - is a kind of dead 
end. We need to understand society as being ‘the result of a bond among people 
that is more basic than politics.’  The problem, of course, is to specify what this 42
‘relation’ is and how it can in some way be the basis for an ethical transformation 
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of political and social structures. This problem is particularly acute given that any 
‘fraternal’ praxis will itself be actualised within and mediated by the existing politi-
cal and social structures. This, one might argue, is the central problem of the Cri-
tique of Dialectical Reason. Commenting retrospectively on that text here, Sartre 
says, that he went ‘looking for’ fraternity and struggled to find it.  43
Certainly Levy challenges Sartre to explain what he means by ‘fraternity’ in 
exactly these terms by asking, ‘how to practice fraternity?’  The danger is that 44
‘fraternity’ - in so far as it is anything more than a banal biological concept - be-
comes little more than a ‘myth’ of common origins. Sartre’s response is that, whilst 
myths can portray and to some extent articulate ‘fraternity’, the basic relation pre-
cedes the ‘invention’ of the myth. It is the myth that explains what people feel as a 
prior commonality. It appears to be important to Sartre that this relationship is in-
herently pre-political -or perhaps trans-political - and derives instead from the ba-
sic ontological and existential structure of a human being. He rejects an abstract 
notion of ‘equality’ as its basis and locates fraternity in the commonality of the ‘af-
fective’ and the ‘practical’.  What Sartre seems to mean by this is that we are all 45
mutually comprehensible in some fundamental sense because of our shared con-
dition. This, of course, is a central feature of his thought but here it means that 
there is the potential to rediscover a kind of original commonality of needs and 
ends. This is a matter of experiencing our ‘common humanity’ as being part of a 
common project to realise Humanity. As Sartre puts it,  ‘They have a common ori-
gin and, in the future, a common end…that’s what constitutes their fraternity.’  In 46
this respect the achievement of ‘Humanity’ will require some kind of common prax-
is based on a common goal. The problem, as always, is that the realisation of 
‘humanity’ requires the kind of fraternal praxis that already presupposes a com-
mon humanity for its sustained efficacy. This is an aspect of the ‘paradox of ethics’ 
that appears in Sartre’s work time and time again, as we will see. Here in this text 
Sartre looks forward to the eventual achievement of ‘humanity’ and ‘true fraternity’ 
and tells us that we might, at least, hope for this because ‘there is an ethics’!  In 47
other words, ‘ethics’ is the paradoxical praxis of attempting to humanely realise 
Humanity on the basis of conditions that are ‘subhuman’. There is a strong sense 
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here of the paradoxical ‘necessity/impossibility of Ethics that appears in the 
Cahiers of the 1940s. As Sartre puts it in Hope Now, ‘Ethics is indispensable, for it 
signifies that men or submen have a future based on principles of common action, 
while a future of materiality - i.e on the basis of scarcity - is simultaneously being 
sketched around them.’   ‘Scarcity’ is a central concept from the Critique and it 48
has a number of facets. In one respect, as Sartre indicates here, it is a necessary 
feature of our materiality. We have a basic relationship with nature as material to 
be consumed. In this way there is what we might call an ‘objective scarcity’ which 
is a function of our overall productive capacities. But production in any kind of 
complex society takes place within a socio-political system which in turn produces 
what we can call ‘relative scarcities’ which is a function of the distribution and allo-
cation of resources and can establish, define and reflect class interests. This 
sense of scarcity is also a key part of the discussion in the Critique and it is clear 
that scarcity can both unite- ‘We must unite against them to save ourselves’ - or it 
can divide - ‘I must compete with you for survival’. Then we have scarcity in its 
most fundamental but also its most empty sense - it is simply a constitutive feature 
of having any desires at all or of any kind of affective/practical relation to the world. 
In Hope Now, it is clear that Sartre is thinking of the central tension between ‘the 
effort…to create Humanity’, and ‘the struggle against scarcity.’ As he says, ‘both 
are human but seem not to be compatible.’  In this context Sartre raises the ethi49 -
cal paradox yet again by saying that, ‘we must try to live’ the ethical end of ‘creat-
ing’ Humanity in the future alongside the practical need to overcome scarcity given 
our current condition now. The ethical problem is how to achieve this simultane-
ously. This is the basic task of achieving ‘Integral Humanity’ from the condition of 
‘subhumanity’. Moreover, this is always a task undertaken in a social and political 
context and a practical field where our ethical praxis and absolute ends are dis-
torted and diverted by ‘counter-finalities’ and the ‘practico-inert’. 
Scarcity, of course, also provides the basis and inspiration for violence. Ul-
timately, violence becomes the response to the scarcities that render our humanity 
or our very lives impossible. Such violence appears in a variety of contexts in 
Sartre’s work but here we need to focus on the way in which violence illustrates an 
aspect of the ‘ethical paradox’ that Sartre faces. This is best seen through a notion 
of ‘redemptive’ or ‘creative’ violence. If the ethical goal is the realisation of some 
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kind of ‘common’ or ‘integral’ humanity and this common humanity is in some way 
primary and ‘outside of history’ as Sartre has claimed, it is difficult to see how vio-
lence as a ‘local’, historically conditioned response can reach it. We can see here 
something of the problem Sartre will face in the Critique of thinking through how a 
united praxis that is genuinely transformative can be sustained in the context of all 
the features of the practical field that divide and oppose us to each other: scarcity, 
oppression, alterity, seriality and the practico-inert. In Hope Now, Levy challenges 
Sartre by referring to Sartre’s previous endorsement of certain kinds of violence, 
particularly in the colonial context. ‘Can violence really have the redemptive role, 
the constituent function, you attributed to it at that time?’  50
Given our discussion so far, Sartre’s response is illuminating. In circum-
stances where there is an entrenched social and political structure that supports 
and perpetuates oppression, Sartre claims that violence is unavoidable. Sartre ad-
dresses the necessity of violence in a number of ways within his work. Here the 
emphasis is on the way in which structures of oppression consolidate ‘absolutely 
opposed points of view’ in the form of ‘interests’ which have already passed into 
the ‘practico-inert’. This is simply another way of saying that a structure like colo-
nialism already conditions the relations within it. Within a colonial system we are 
either ‘colonisers’ or ‘colonised’. The fact that the oppression of colonialism could 
not be overturned by some ‘ideal’ act of will or moral conversion is a feature of his 
writings on the Algerian situation in the 1950s. Sartre had also raised rather wist-
fully in the Cahiers and elsewhere the possibility of an ethics of spontaneous con-
version where we all become ‘ethical at once’. This is a feature of the ‘idealism’ in 
his ethical writings of second half of the 1940s that he dismissed as his thinking 
progressed yet it never entirely disappears. In Hope Now, he claims that the vio-
lence of the colonial struggle is not something that, in itself, realises some further, 
transcendent ethical end. ‘Violence’, he says, ‘is not going to speed up the pace of 
history and draw humanity together.’  But it is also clear that, if the structure of 51
oppression constitutes the practical field and - in the absence of some miraculous 
ethical conversion - if the oppressive structure is held in place by ‘interests’ that 
are themselves partly ‘practico-inert’, then violence will be necessary to dismantle 
 ibid. p.9250
 ibid. p.9251
                                                                 21
‘a certain state of enslavement that was making it impossible for people to become 
human beings.’52
This may well seem like a pretentious way of saying simply that if you op-
press people sufficiently they will fight back! But violence in Sartre’s thinking is, as 
we have seen, a product of scarcity and of antagonistic interests. It is also a prod-
uct of the way in which group unities can be constituted under the threat of some 
danger external to the group. Obviously, this is a core feature of Sartre’s analysis 
in the Critique. In the context of Hope Now it is worth considering the way in which 
Sartre characterises violence and the kind of common praxis that underlies it as 
something that clears a space for the possibility of truly ethical ends. However un-
comfortable we might feel discussing violence of this kind in an ethical context, it is 
important to recognise Sartre’s intellectual honesty in attempting to address what 
seems to be a sadly evident feature of human relations under conditions of scarci-
ty and imbalances of power. The problem, as always, is to try to understand how 
we can reach ethical ends from concrete conditions of violence in all its forms. In 
Hope Now, it is not the violence that realises the ethical end. Instead, it leaves all 
the ethical work still to do but it breaks down the closed cycle of violence and 
counter-violence that makes ethics in its fundamental, absolute sense impossible. 
This clearly has the air of a paradox: How can violence overcome the cycle of vio-
lence? 
From what Sartre has to say in Hope Now, it appears that he remained un-
sure about how violence as such relates to any kind of common praxis that is ca-
pable of positing an absolute ethical end. In other words how violence can actively 
promote fraternity. As he says, ‘I still don’t see the real relationship between vio-
lence and fraternity.’  For our purposes here all we need to note is that an essen53 -
tial feature of any group that shares a common internal relation - in other words 
any group that is not simply ordered by each individual’s relation to a common ex-
ternal structure, what Sartre calls a ‘serial’ collective in the Critique - will be the in-
centive to unite together against a common threat, either real or imagined/manu-
factured. In this way some of Sartre’s writings suggest that commonality and ulti-
mately ‘fraternity’ comes about in and through violence in response to the threats 
inherent in ‘scarcity’. As Levy puts it to Sartre, ’Does the experience of fraternity 
 ibid. p.9252
 ibid. p.9353
                                                                 22
appear through the activity of killing one’s enemy?’  This would also have a para54 -
doxical air - we begin to realise our humanity when we are at our most inhuman 
and desperate. Not only this, but unity would also depend on a wider separation 
and division. We only unite against others external to our unity who threaten us. In 
Hope Now Sartre denies that he any longer believes that fraternity is the experi-
ence of common violence; but he is clearly aware that he now needs some expla-
nation of how fraternity can be reached beyond and independently of violence and 
opposition. 
One implicit issue is whether fraternity or what Sartre refers to in his think-
ing of the 1960s as ‘integral humanity’ is an original relation between us that has in 
some way been disrupted or broken. The other is the way in which fraternity as an 
ethical end supposes a universal scope that includes within it all beings capable of 
realising their ‘humanity’ or of being prevented from doing so. In other words, is 
fraternity rediscovered or created anew? We have already discussed above 
Sartre’s claim that humanity has a ‘common origin’ and a ‘common end’.  At this 
point in his conversation with Levy, Sartre puts it like this, ‘To have an ethics, you 
need to extend the idea of fraternity until it becomes the manifest, unique relation-
ship among all human beings. At first it’s a relationship within a group…’  He sug55 -
gests that there is an original relation of kinship ‘bound in some way to the idea of 
family.’ This basic group relation is always defined in distinction to ‘others’ external 
to it. Violence, he says, is a response to others transgressing ‘the frontier binding 
fraternity within itself.’ Such violence, he now believes, is ‘the very opposite of fra-
ternity.’  Needless to say, this hardly clarifies things! 56
All these ambiguities feature in the section of Hope Now entitled ‘Unity 
through Insurrection’. Here Levy takes the lead and Sartre confines himself to 
commenting on Levy’s summary. Essentially, Levy sets out a theoretical summary 
of violence and fraternity. Levy puts this in the context of his claim that revolution-
ary or insurrectional praxis is only ‘meaningful’ if we ‘do away with the concept of 
fraternity-terror.’  What this would boil down to is finding a way to sustain fraternal 57
unity beyond the externally directed violence of the initial formation of the insurrec-
tional group which is internalised within the group. In the Critique, Sartre had de-
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veloped the concept of fraternity-terror in his analysis of the tendency of the insur-
rectional group to sustain its unity by internalising its violence against its own 
members. As Sartre discovered, it seems difficult, to say the least, to reach the 
kind of ethical fraternity that would represent the realisation of a common humanity 
in such a way. Under these conditions, the initial opening onto a new future closes 
back on itself and the possibility of attaining a universal transformation of our ethi-
cal condition disappears. Levy employs the rather heavy-handed metaphor of birth 
to illustrate this but his meaning is clear enough. ‘Fraternity’, he says, ‘appears at 
the end of a long maturation, the birth of a relationship lived as human 
experience.’ Continuing the metaphor he says, ‘the use of certain forms of vio-
lence is akin to a cesarean section: we are dealing with the removal of an obstacle 
to birth.’ To see continuing violence as necessary to the maintenance of unity 
would be, Levy concludes, to focus exclusively on ‘the use of forceps.’!  58
So far we have the notion of some process of development which might or 
might not lead to what Levy calls ‘the unity of the human enterprise.’ This he links 
to ‘the ideal of a human totality’ and the revolt or the insurrection becomes ‘an ap-
peal to an ethical order.’  The problem is that the moment of revolt which clears 59
the way for this possibility tends to shift focus away from an open future based on 
an appeal to universal humanity to a concentration on the confrontation itself. 
Drawing on his experience as one of the leaders of the student insurrection of 
1968, Levy then goes on to describe a transition from the moment of ‘birth’ where 
all men are potentially ‘brothers’ - for example, the soldier or the policeman is po-
tentially just another ‘brother’ - to a moment in which the insurrectionary group de-
fines itself precisely in and through its confrontation with the ‘other’. Sartre’s com-
ment at this stage is that this transition is ‘provoked’ by the ‘enemy’ and the activity 
of this enemy obviously shapes the development and scope of the insurrectionary 
group. Levy’s response is to suggest that this unity within confrontation may not be 
simply a contingent feature of how the insurrectionary situation happens to devel-
op but an integral part of how these kinds of groups function. As he says, ‘It is, in 
fact, the violence of the repression that gives the insurgents the necessary unity…
Is it the adversary who confers unity, or have they undertaken a positive unifica-
tion?’ . As far as Levy is concerned, the positive and the negative facets of ‘unity’ 60
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cannot be disentangled and this leads inevitably to ‘bad radicalisation’ in the form 
discussed earlier in their conversation where unity is held together by confronta-
tion and directed forms of violence. As Levy puts it, ‘The positive enterprise toward 
unification is halted, and resorting to this form of negative unity, brought about by 
the former power, serves to camouflage the standstill.’  61
We have dwelt on this section of the conversation at some length because, 
although it is Levy who is supplying the analysis of the insurrectionary group, the 
implications of his analysis have a clear resonance within the wider context of 
Sartre’s work. What Levy refers to as the ‘perversion’ of revolutionary politics, is 
also, of course, a feature of Sartre’s analysis of group structure in the Critique - the 
group ‘in fusion’; the ‘pledged’, ‘statutory’ group; and the ‘institution’. All we need to 
note here for our purposes is simply that Sartre is being confronted with the basic 
problem of how to articulate and implement an ethical end that aims at the ‘totality 
of humanity’ from within situations and structures that constantly tend to reduce 
some momentary experience of ‘positive unity’ into ‘negative unity’ defined by con-
flicts of interest and incipient or actual violence and institutionalisation. Levy’s 
analysis draws on this as he runs through ‘the process of insurrection.’ There is 
the moment of ‘uprising’ itself where it seems ‘everything is possible’, then the 
moment of ‘rupture’ where people ‘become brothers against the other’ . At this 62
point revolutionary politics can be institutionalised in the form of some ‘ironclad’ 
negative unity which Levy here exemplifies with ‘Leninism’. Sartre indicates his 
agreement with this ‘account of the three phases in which violence appears’ but 
defers his reservations to a further work on ethics that he was planning with 
Levy.  This, of course, was never realised. 63
All this is hardly a resounding and detailed basis for hope. On the face of it, 
at least, it seems that we are separated from the realisation of ‘complete humanity’ 
by the inevitable ‘perversion of revolutionary politics’. It may well be the case that 
the ‘uprising’ is, as Levy puts it, ‘one moment in the long enterprise of human unifi-
cation, only one facet of the fraternal experience.’  But without a concrete under64 -
standing of either the goal or the means by which to achieve it, it seems difficult to 
undertake the enterprise at all. 
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This brings us to the closing and most controversial section of Hope Now. 
Levy, the former radical and student leader of ‘68 who has now reasserted his 
Jewish identity, steers Sartre towards a discussion of Judaism and Jewish cultural 
and religious identity. Obviously, Levy has his own agenda here and he asks 
Sartre a range of challenging questions related to his earlier writings on Judaism 
and Jews. However, our concern is not directly with this aspect of the conversation 
but rather with the bearing of what Sartre has to say on the issue of ‘hope’ and the 
ethical context within which it might be realised. In this respect we need to focus 
on the notion of ‘messianism’ which emerges from the conversation. The interest 
lies in part in the way Sartre responds to Levy’s suggestion that ‘the Jew is doubly 
concerned by our problem.’  By this Levy means the ethical ambiguity at the heart 65
of revolutionary activity. In other words the relationship between that moment of 
openness and universal brotherhood and that moment of ‘sacred violence’ that 
negatively defines the group against the ‘other’. The messianic element is the 
possibility of redemptive transformation in an open or ‘pure’ future. In this sense, of 
course, it obviously has an affinity with revolutionary action. Equally obviously the 
‘perversions of this idea’ are the ways in which such ideals of universal humanity 
can degenerate into division, discrimination and violence.  66
In response to Levy’s challenge that Sartre’s previous views amounted to a 
denial of any intrinsic Jewish identity, Sartre replies, ‘I now think there is a Jewish 
reality beyond the ravages that anti-semitism has inflicted on Jews…’ In this con-
text, the way that Sartre begins to divert Levy’s intentions in the service of his own 
is interesting. ‘The Jew believes he has a destiny,’ Sartre says.  Again, the notion 67
of ‘destiny’ appears in a variety of guises in Sartre’s work. In the context of the Cri-
tique, ‘destiny’ can be written into the practico-inert structures in the sense that 
certain outcomes for individuals are already rendered inherently more probable or 
even necessitated by the way in which our past activity or praxis has structured 
the practical field. This is the sense in which it is the ‘destiny’ of the poor to die 
younger or for some member of a minority to face discrimination and disadvan-
tage. It is also a feature of the practico-inert that the ‘destiny’ it contains need not 
be the result of any direct intention although it is still due to our activity. So in this 
sense, it may well be the destiny of all of us to face environmental catastrophe al-
 ibid. p.9965
 ibid. p.10066
 ibid. p.10167
                                                                 26
though, one hopes, very few of us have made such a future the deliberate object 
of our activity. Here, in this section of Hope Now, Sartre is working with a notion of 
‘destiny’ that emphasises the seminal, intentional, creative and imaginative sense 
of positing a certain kind of ultimate end to our activity. Such an end is constitutive 
and underlies our praxis a little like the ‘original project’ of Sartre’s earlier work. 
Moreover, the act of positing such a destiny is an inherently ethical one and, as 
such, ‘metaphysical’ in the sense that it is not simply the product of a practical re-
sponse to the material conditions of any particular condition.  The interest of this 68
passage in the discussion lies in the way in which Sartre attempts to bring out this 
notion of the ‘ethical’ and the ‘metaphysical’ in his discussion of Jewish identity 
and ‘messianism’. For example, part of what Sartre is saying is that his previous 
characterisation of Jewish identity saw things negatively in that the Jew ‘is con-
stantly being dragged down on all sides by anti-Semitic ideas, which are trying to 
devour him, to take over his thinking and capture him at the core of his being…I 
confined the existence of the Jew to that…’  What Sartre is now concerned with is 69
a more positive sense of how individual and group identities can be constituted. In 
this respect, although Levy is clearly interested in discussing Jewish identity as 
such, Sartre has in mind the implications for humanity as a whole; the Jewish 
community is an example of a wider and deeper point. 
A fundamental aspect of Sartre’s point emerges from the way in which he 
indulges in a certain kind of self-criticism. This is worth quoting directly. Referring 
to his earlier work he says, ‘There was a consciousness of self that I stripped of all 
individual characteristics that might have come from within and that I then made it 
rediscover from the outside. Once the Jew was deprived of metaphysical and sub-
jective characteristics, he could not exist as such in my philosophy. Today I see 
men differently.’  Of course, the allusion here is to all the various ways in which 70
Sartre had seen the being of the individual as constantly threatened by other sub-
jectivities or as becoming the object of the praxis of ‘the other’. So the ‘look’ of an-
other individual can fix us in our being as can the hostile activity of ‘the enemy’ or 
the past praxis of ‘the others’ which becomes embodied in the practico-inert can 
condition us. It was in this sense that Sartre had seemed to claim that the Jew 
was, in Levy’s provocative formulation, ‘an invention of anti-Semites.’  In any case, 
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the deeper issue is, as we have said, not Jewishness in itself but how far a certain 
kind of common identity can be constituted and sustained in a way that depends 
on a common ethical end and not on a relation or reaction to the external ‘other’ in 
whatever form. We can start to see then that Sartre is using the discussion of Jew-
ishness as way of articulating his understanding of the deeper ethical problem that 
has run through the interview as a whole. This also allows us to better understand 
the otherwise puzzling nature of this section of the discussion. 
From what Sartre says it is clear that what interests him is the ‘metaphysical 
link of the Jew with the infinite.’  What then follows is a fascinating exchange 71
where Sartre is at his most animated and resolutely resists Levy’s attempts to 
steer him in the desired direction. Sartre says that it is not the religious aspect of 
Judaism as such that he is concerned with but rather the way in which the meta-
physical character of the relationship with God implies an absolutely transcendent 
end; a ‘destiny’. In Sartre’s words this means that there is the belief that, ‘this 
world will end and, at the same moment, another world will appear - another world 
that will be made of this one but in which things will be differently arranged.’  72
Such a new world will redeem all the dead of the past in a rebirth into a new world. 
This is the metaphysical end that reunites and defines. Such an end, Sartre goes 
on to say, ‘is at bottom social as well as religious…’ At this point Sartre is interrupt-
ed by Levy with a clear invitation to relate his interest in Messianism to his previ-
ous espousal of Marxism as the only philosophical paradigm within which to un-
derstand social transformation. Sartre’s response is, again, worth quoting. He is 
interested in it ‘precisely because it contains no Marxist element…it is not an end 
that is defined in terms of the present situation and then projected into the future, 
one that will be attained by stages through the development of certain facts today.’ 
Sartre goes on to explain that what appeals to him is the aspect of absolute tran-
scendence or rupture with how things are in favour of a new beginning: ‘the ap-
pearance of the ethical existence of men who live for one another.’  In this way, 73
Sartre claims, the ‘search for an ethics’ is exactly the search for a particular kind of 
metaphysical end. As Sartre puts it here, it is the metaphysical structure of a Mes-
sianic belief in the possibility of a total, redemptive transformation of our ethical 
condition that attracts him. ‘Non-Jews’, he says, ‘are searching for an ethics too,’ 
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and this search is a quest for ‘the ultimate end, the moment when ethics will be 
simply and truly the way in which human beings live in relation to each other.’   74
Again, as we will see, the relationship between our particular situation and an ‘ul-
timate end’ is a constant theme of his attempts to think through the ethical problem 
in the most fundamental way. The basic issue is easy enough to articulate and we 
have already had occasion to raise it. It is simply how to move from a practical 
field that is characterised by divisions of ‘interests’, negative definitions of identity 
and group membership, imbalances of power within the social structure, scarcities 
of material and other goods and so on, to one in which ‘ethics’ is simply the totality 
of our ‘relation to each other’. In this way we could think of it as being a matter of 
two different levels of ‘transcendence’ of our situation. Obviously, we might then 
have different kinds of ends or might, in Sartre’s idiom, seek to ‘surpass’ our situa-
tion in different ways and common dangers and common needs can unite us un-
der a common end. For example, we may well join together to fight this particular 
injustice or unite in response to some intolerable oppression which makes our life 
impossible. At one level there is this obstacle to be overcome and this fight to be 
won. So we act together in common against the ‘enemy’. If we can sustain our uni-
ty and deploy the right kind and level of force we might even win. But what have 
we won? At the particular level, we have merely won the possibility of taking on the 
next struggle or dealing with another enemy. Of course, it is not that Sartre wants 
to say that whatever specific end we might have at this level is in some way 
wrong. So it was right to fight against colonialism in Algeria or it may be right to 
take direct action against climate change or whatever; but these kinds of more lim-
ited ends cannot be the ‘ultimate’ ethical end. This ultimate end is the transforma-
tion of human relations such that the totality of human relations is ethics. An impli-
cation of this is that at the level of the particular struggle there is a kind of ‘sub-
ethics’ where our limited ends might well have an ethical dimension but these ends 
are formed and realised within a situation that is in itself not ethical in the sense 
that the totality of human relations have not yet been transformed. 
There are a range of further implications of this that we will need to explore 
as we track the theme back into Sartre’s major works but here we can simply ex-
amine the way Sartre develops his final thoughts in this closing section of the in-
terview. As far as Sartre is concerned, the advantage of messianism is that it might 
 ibid. p.10674
                                                                 29
allow us to rethink the relationship between revolutionary activity and an ultimate 
ethical end. This has to do with how revolutionaries might conceive of their more 
ultimate goals. On the plausible assumption that revolutionary activity is driven by 
some values relating to human well-being, then ‘revolution’ will involve ‘doing away 
with the present society and replacing it by a juster society in which human beings 
can have good relations with each other.’  Sartre points out that ‘a society of this 
kind is not a de facto society; it is, you might say a de jure society. That is, a soci-
ety in which the relations among human beings are ethical.’  It is not the case, in 75
other words, that the ultimate ethical end can be realised simply by dealing with 
and overcoming one obstacle after another and certainly not by supposing that it is 
in some way inherent in the objective structure of society or history or whatever 
other force might be adduced. Rather, the ethical end is a metaphysical commit-
ment to developing a totality of relationships within which we can realise our full 
humanity. Such a goal envelops and conditions what we actually do in specific 
conditions but is not itself an immediate surpassing or response to this obstacle or 
that danger. As Sartre puts things here, ‘…it’s through a kind of messianism that 
one can conceive of this ethics as the ultimate goal of revolution. There will be 
immense economic problems, of course, but…they are not the essential problems. 
Their solution is, in some cases, a means of securing a true relationship among 
men.’76
The interview closes with Sartre directly discussing both hope and despair. 
He says he has been ‘tempted by despair’ twice in his life. Once during World War 
II where he found himself ‘confronting a world of suffering, evil and despair.’ His 
recourse was to ally himself ‘with friends who were not despairing, who believed 
you could fight for a happy future although there was no possibility whatever that 
this future might come into being. One had to resist, no question about it, but the 
true fortunes of war were out of our hands…’  Despair tempts him, too, in 1980 as 77
he considers the contemporary political scene characterised by ‘the triumph of 
rightist ideas’, the possibility of a third world war, division between rich and poor 
and ‘the wretched mess our planet has become.’  His final, poignant words are 78
worth quoting in full. ‘Despair,’ he says, ‘has come back to tempt me with the idea 
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that there is no end to it all, that there is no goal, that there are only small, individ-
ual objectives that we fight for. We make small revolutions, but there’s no human 
end, there’s nothing of concern to human beings, there’s only disorder.  Referring 79
to his death which he imagines approaching in five or ten years, he goes on, ‘the 
world seems ugly, evil and hopeless. such is the calm despair of an old man who 
will die in that despair. But the point is, I’m resisting, and I know I shall die in hope. 
But this hope must be grounded.’  Sartre was hospitalised and died just a few 80
months later. 
So, at this point, it might be worth noting the sheer range of themes that 
Hope Now raises. The contention being advanced here is that, within the confines 
of the interview and the limitations of his state of health, Sartre is genuinely at-
tempting to continue his ethical thinking. What he has to say, far from being some 
radical and aberrant reversal of his previous intellectual trajectory by an enfeebled 
and confused old man, can instead fruitfully be seen as a critical summary of his 
‘search for an ethics’. Even though the contemporary world may be ‘horrible’, as 
he tells us, this situation is only ‘one moment in a long historical development’.  In 81
this way ‘hope’ is the culmination of his thinking and to understand what it might 
mean and how it might be grounded we need to track back into the development 
of Sartre’s thought and follow the evolution of the central ethical themes contained 
in his last thoughts. 
How, then, should we summarise what Hope Now gives us to work with? 
There is the notion of the ‘goal’ or the ‘project’ and how far we could ever adopt 
some absolutely transcendent end of ‘total’ or ‘integral humanity’ as a single, all-
encompassing ethical end. There is clearly the continuing issue of ‘failure’ or the 
way in which our project can be diverted or the ‘open future’ it posits closed off. 
There are a variety of ways in which this can happen but the result is, in Sartre’s 
pithy phrase, that the ‘whole shitty mess’ starts up again. But then why should 
‘hope’ ever be our ‘conception of the future’? Part of the issue here is how far we 
should see ‘hope’ simply as what McBride calls ‘a mental attitude and not a philo-
sophical position.’  As far as McBride is concerned, what the philosophy can es82 -
tablish about our condition is one thing and how we feel about that another. On 
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this view, Sartre’s philosophical arguments show that a transition to ‘integral hu-
manity’ will be difficult to say the least and he faces a choice of ‘hope’ or ‘despair’; 
he chooses hope after vacillating between the two. This is ‘normal in a very 
thoughtful person.’  We might already want to take issue with this and grant 83
‘hope’ a more substantial and integral role in his philosophical thinking. For exam-
ple, we might see hope not merely as an attitude but as a fundamental basis for 
action or even a necessary basis. This would be hope as a feature of praxis. It 
might be said that the tenor of Sartre’s remarks in Hope Now support this more 
substantial view. The search for the place of ethics in consciousness takes us from 
the problem of the ‘spirit of seriousness’ into a re-examination of the context of the 
ethical choice. This is ‘generosity’ and the ‘gift’ and the experience of the other as 
the source of ‘obligation’. As Flynn remarks, the experience of the other as a 
source of ‘ethical requisition’ has ‘a distinctly Levinassian mark’.  In this way there 84
is strong sense of a ‘conversion’ to ‘fraternity’ through a certain kind of recognition 
of the ‘other’. Yet any such recognition and any such realisation of our humanity is 
never simply an ‘ideal’ moment outside of the temporal and material conditions of 
history. It must also be conditioned by them and attempt to condition them in turn. 
This is the basic tension in Sartre’s search for an ethics between the ‘ideal’ and the 
‘real’. He might have dismissed his ‘first’ ethics as ‘idealist’ but the ‘real’ in the form 
of the materiality of history also appears in what he calls the ‘curious dialectic of 
ethics and history’. It is to the Cahiers that we now turn to explore this further.  
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Hope then…The Cahiers. 1947/48
The Cahiers is a frustrating text. It is thematically diverse, partial, transition-
al and unfinished. But, in part because of these features and because of its place 
within the overall context of Sartre’s work, it is a rich and important one. Sartre 
may have dismissed his thinking in the Cahiers as ‘idealist’ - and what exactly he 
might have meant by this will be something we will need to consider as we pro-
ceed - but there is also a clear attempt to relate his ethical thinking to historical, 
social and collective structures and contexts. In this respect, there is much in the 
text that prefigures the dialectical analysis of the Critique. Furthermore, the text 
contains the fundamental basis of the ‘ethical paradox’ that Sartre grappled with 
intellectually and practically until the end of his life. In understanding his concep-
tion of this paradox we can also come to understand and appreciate the sense in 
which he ended his life in ‘hope’. So despite its limitations and frustrations, the 
Cahiers repays close study. 
 It is instructive to note that the Cahiers opens with Sartre raising the basic 
distinction between a transcendent ethical end, hypostasised as the being and will 
of God, and a moral praxis rooted and focused on our existence in the world. On 
the one hand, in perfecting ourselves we ‘serve’, ‘praise’ and ‘aid’ the divine cre-
ation. We are ‘egoists’ concerned with our own perfection because this is also to 
reflect the perfection of the divine ‘other’ in us. As far as Sartre is concerned this is 
a ‘subordination of doing to being.’ We are Hegelian ‘beautiful souls’  whose ethi-
cal end is ‘a certain mode of ontological being’ - being moral. Such a morality has 
only itself as embodied in the individual as its end. It has no real connection with 
the world and with others. Such a morality is both an ‘ontological individualism’ 
and an alienation since our ‘perfection’ as individuals is always the perfection of 
the divine in us. Sartre contrasts this with a morality that ‘transcends itself toward 
an end that is not itself.’ Morality is a form of praxis and is characterised by its 
substantive ends. As he says, ‘It must be a choice of a world, not of a self.’1
 This opening passage of the Cahiers presents in its most basic form the 
ethical problematic that Sartre sets out to address in this text and beyond. The on-
going tensions between these two fundamental forms of what it might be to have 
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ethical ends or a ‘morality’ necessarily involve a sustained investigation into the 
ontological basis of any genuine or substantive ethics. At this point Sartre puts the 
issue in terms of an idiom of ‘inside and outside.’  This relation of interiority and 2
exteriority appears in a variety of guises and increasing complexity as his investi-
gations proceed. Here we have the basic notion of the tension in ethics between 
what we might call living the ‘Good’ as the posited end of activity and knowing the 
‘Good’ as some kind of universal essence. As Sartre puts it in the notes included 
as an appendix in the Cahiers, ‘The Good cannot be conceived apart from an act-
ing subjectivity, and yet it is beyond this subjectivity. Subjective in that it must al-
ways emanate from a subjectivity and never impose itself on this subjectivity from 
the outside, it is objective in that it is, in its universal essence, strictly independent 
of this subjectivity.’  The issue as always is how these two aspects can be recon3 -
ciled. As Sartre says, ‘One must be ethical from within one’s desire not from out-
side. Yet on the other hand would there be any morality without the universal?’  4
The Kantian flavour hardly needs emphasising here. 
What is interesting about Sartre’s thinking at this stage is that he is clearly 
desperately trying to work through all the implicit oppositions here. For example, 
any ‘morality’ worthy of the name must be more than subjective desires writ large. 
Yet, ‘the one and only basis of moral life must be spontaneity, that is, the immedi-
ate, the unreflective.’ In other words, any process of ethical reflection must begin 
with this life, this situation, this humanity. Yet, of course, ethical reflection must 
also withdraw in some way from this situation to evaluate it and to posit an ethical 
end that transcends it. Finally, ethical reflection must return back to this situation 
armed with some conception of how things ought to be - such an conception will 
have an universal character but will relate to and be applied in concrete circum-
stances. Working with this structure, which superficially seems simple enough, 
there are number of significant ideas that Sartre begins to develop. In fact, it might 
be said that it is the way in which Sartre works through the underlying complexities 
ontologically and phenomenologically that gives his ethics such honesty and 
depth. Here in the Cahiers, Sartre begins that process. 
One implication is that, if ethics starts with and returns to the concrete situa-
tion then ‘Ethics must be historical: that is, it must find the universal in History and 
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must grasp it in History.’ Already we find ourselves in a more Hegelian idiom. The 5
ethical end may be universal but ‘possible man comes from the concrete one. We 
are such that the possible becomes possible starting from us.’ Ethical thinking 
about ‘the deepest ends of existence’ must always return to ‘the finite and histori-
cal source of possibilities. To this society.’  At this stage, Sartre appears genuinely 6
unsure what to do with the implicit contrasts between these features of the ethical: 
The concrete and the universal; the actual and the possible; self and other; the 
spontaneity of freedom and the inertness of nature; the finite historical and the in-
finite transhistorical; the immediate and the mediated and so on. These are all 
ways of thinking about the fundamental ethical paradox in terms of interiority and 
exteriority. Sartre’s problem is that he is looking for some way of establishing a 
kind of dynamic dialogue between ‘the inside and the outside’ whilst still working 
initially with the largely static ontological structure of Being and Nothingness. This 
is clear in how he initially tries to think through the ethical in terms of the various 
levels of ‘reflection’ that form part of the structure of consciousness in his earlier 
ontology. Such a process of ‘reflection’ is always fraught with the dangers of ‘inau-
thenticity' and ‘bad faith’ and the doomed project of the For-itself-in-itself. What all 
this amounts to is that our primary mode of being is to be ‘unreflectively’ engaged 
actively in the world. Yet because we lack an ‘essence’ there is a tendency, in what 
Sartre calls ‘accessory reflection’, to take ourselves as the object for conscious-
ness. In this way we grant ourselves an ‘essence’ and reify a self/ego which we 
then can take as our being. Sartre sees this as a denial of our fundamental onto-
logical freedom and therefore a denial of our concomitant responsibility for our be-
ing. As Sartre puts it in the Cahiers,’ The origin of reflection is an effort by the For-
itself to recuperate itself, in order to arrive at a For-Itself that would be Itself.’  In 7
theory at least, we can come to understand ourselves in a non-objectifying way 
such that we realise that no substantial self/ego exists and we are pure ‘spontane-
ity’ or active freedom in the world, responsible for and ‘condemned’ to make our 
being. Sartre terms this ‘pure’ or ‘non-accessory’ reflection. The problem, Sartre 
realises, is how to reach the ethical through reflection. One possibility is simply to 
be good as an act of will. I determine myself as good. 
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There are a number of potential problems with this. One is that if ‘the one 
and only basis of moral life must be spontaneity, that is the immediate, the unre-
flective,’ then my moral choice will always be a ‘choice in immediacy’ as Sartre 
puts it.  In other words, how can we move from a ‘choice of self’ to a ‘choice of 8
world.’ ? Furthermore, a certain kind of determination of myself as ethical would be 
the Kantian one where I universalise my own self-determination. This would be a 
separation from ‘spontaneity’ and the concrete situation to create an abstract and 
formal universal ethical structure. Despite its universality, it is still a choice of self, 
not of world. Indeed the choice of oneself as universal subject in the Kantian 
sense is to choose myself as the other which, in Sartre’s terms, is a kind of alien-
ation and self-oppression. Additionally, there is always the danger that any ethical 
self-determination becomes simply an ‘accessory reflection’ and we take ourselves 
as the object of an act of will in such a way that we fall into bad faith and what 
Sartre terms, ‘the spirit of seriousness’. Sartre is aware of these difficulties but is 
not sure of how to redefine the ethical problem in such a way that it can be further 
pursued. Part of the fascination of this opening section of the Cahiers is that we 
can see his mind at work as he tries to do this. He appreciates that he needs to 
work ‘toward a concrete ethics (synthesis of the universal and the historical)’; but 
he is not sure of how to move from self to world. If ‘ethics is an individual, subjec-
tive, and historical enterprise’, it is also ‘all the broader and all the more profound if 
it has to do with a larger group.’  Indeed, if it is to be anything more than the story 9
of an individual path to self perfection there will surely need to be a wider dimen-
sion of ‘humanity’ or ‘society’. Already we have some tentative hints at what we 
might call the ‘search for a dialectic.’ Here this means understanding the ‘universal’ 
as historically situated in the ‘concrete - that is, social - situation’ and Sartre claims 
that ‘Kantianism teaches nothing on this subject’.  Then, there follows an interest10 -
ing  passage in which Sartre develops his theme. It gives a form of summary of the 
various elements of the ethical problematic that will engage him to the end and its 
inherent ambiguities and tensions. It is his plan for the work on ethics that the 
Cahiers never quite became and it shows a really honest and perceptive thinker 
‘on his way’. 
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Ironically this plan is prefaced by the remark, ‘don’t wait for an ethics filled 
with hope. Men are ignoble. We have to love them for what they might be, not for 
what they are. Sketch out a tough ethics.’ Such an ethics will have to address the 
‘absurdity and necessity of an ethics’. We have already had occasion to advert to 
this paradoxical formulation and we will need to bear it in mind as we proceed and 
consider just what it might mean. Of course one way of approaching such a para-
dox is to emphasise the necessity of making some judgement and of realising 
some value in our action and the problem of securely grounding that value. Sartre 
points to ‘an oscillation between an ethics of inwardness…and an ethics of the 
transcendent.’ The former is value as taste and the latter value as objective knowl-
edge. On the subjective side the intention is ‘cut off from the act’ and on the objec-
tive side the results are ‘cut off from the intention.’  Whether this is the best way to 11
characterise things is not the issue here rather the contrast between a subjective 
ethics as groundless and empty ‘gratuitousness’ and an objective ethics ‘as op-
pression’ is important to how he wants to discuss ethics in terms of freedom.  The 12
point here is that in the subjective case all we have are whatever affective impuls-
es occur to us at any given time. In the objective case, all the obligation and value 
comes from the exterior, from a source that is beyond our being and we must just 
come to ‘know’ and ‘to know it is to do it’. There are clear implications here for rela-
tion between freedom and ethics and this will involve a focus on interiority and ex-
teriority, self and other and self and world. It also, of course, reflects the two as-
pects of ‘bad faith’. Either I am ‘gratuitous’ subjectivity or I am already transcended 
and objectified by a set of values that are not my own. This is a development of 
the ‘spirit of seriousness’ which sees objective values in this sense as ‘posited by 
a consciousness that is not mine’. In this way ‘my initial situation is to have a des-
tiny/nature and exist in the face of objectified values.’  So the problem of an ‘au13 -
thentic’ ethics is exactly the problem of reconciling these two aspects, our pure 
freedom and our being-for-others. In other words how can my freedom become 
the source of an ethics that freely binds myself and others. It hardly needs to be 
stated that this is a form of Kantian rational autonomy. But, crucially, Sartre recog-
nises the need to bring this rational, universal self-determination into the concrete 
situation of society and history - to ‘dissociate the universal (understanding) from 
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its infinite extension.’  The ‘concrete universal’ is always a situated determination. 14
The problem is that, as Sartre sees things at this point in his thinking, a key feature 
of our situation is exactly that we always find ourselves as ‘a transcended objectiv-
ity for another’.  In other words, if we must reach the ethical universal from a con15 -
crete historical condition then we will always be trying to create an authentic ethics 
of freedom from an alienated condition of oppression. ‘Oppression’ is a key con-
cept for Sartre but at this stage all it refers to is the potential for our subjectivity to 
be conditioned from the ‘exterior’ by ‘the other’. Interestingly Sartre refers to ‘the 
privileged position of the ethicist’. Such an individual, might occupy an ‘historical 
position’ which could give some critical distance on the framework of oppression. 
But such an individual would still be both ‘oppressor’ and ‘oppressed’ and thus 
able ‘to conceive of the necessity of an ethics without oppression, hence to con-
ceive of conversion.’  ‘Conversion’, therefore, is Sartre’s term for the shift in con16 -
sciousness towards an ethics which would be neither empty subjectivity nor op-
pressive objectivity. 
By this point we should already have a good sense of the terms in which 
Sartre is framing the problem. ‘One cannot be converted alone’, he writes, conver-
sion ‘will imply not just an internal change in me but a real change in the other.’  17
This reciprocal change is something that would have to happen within the histori-
cally conditioned social process. Without such an ‘historical change, there is no 
absolute moral conversion.’ We have, therefore, yet another version of the ethical 
paradox. ‘Conversion’ is not an act of will on the part of some pure subjectivity but 
instead involves a particular kind of consciousness of and communication with an-
other or the ‘others’. Of course, Sartre wants to understand this relationship in 
terms of freedom but inevitably if, before ‘conversion’ at least, our freedoms are 
inherently in conflict then the kind of communication necessary to build an authen-
tic ethics of freedom will be difficult to achieve. Nevertheless communication, he 
tells us, ‘does not exist - it must be brought about.’  We might try, for example, to 18
overcome the barriers to communication through ‘Love’ where, here at least, 
Sartre tells us, we feel our ‘own freedom with respect to every gesture of the other 
person as a beginning and as an absolute.’ But even if this is the case, this is only 
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a specific relation that takes place in the wider context of ‘the presence of a third 
observer and under the sign of oppression.’ In this way the absolute communica-
tion in love can be ‘poisoned’ from outside the immediate relation. Another possi-
bility is, he notes, ‘The Appeal’. In Sartre’s terms this must mean something like 
the Hegelian demand for recognition but with a twist. Both I and the other are 
‘detotalised totalities’.  There are a number of ways of understanding this Sartre19 -
an term. It’s essential point is simply that in any inter-subjective, social field there 
will be an irreducible component of freedom. The way in which I, as an active be-
ing-in-the-world, constitute my world - this is what I’m doing, this is the way the 
world is, this is what it means, this is what you are etc. - can always be overturned 
or ‘nihilated’ by your freedom. The way I constitute my world is my ‘totalisation’ and 
that totalisation already includes you and your acts but any totalisation I make then 
becomes the basis for your further, free totalisation which in turn…and so on. In 
other words, our fundamental relation as mutual freedoms is such that our totalisa-
tions are constantly de-totalised and if we are the totality of our being-in-the-world, 
as seems plausible, then we are ‘detotalised totalities’. 
The notion of detotalized-totality is a key element of Sartre’s thinking as he 
moves into an overtly dialectical approach and we will have occasion to discuss 
this further in that context. Here in the Cahiers he is still working his way out of the 
more limited and static ontology of Being and Nothingness. He is still not sure how 
to connect and reconcile individual ‘freedoms’. Certainly, if almost by magic, our 
freedoms are mutually compatible in some pure ‘Kingdom of Ends’, then the exer-
cise of my freedom is always the same as its full realisation. Moreover, in such a 
common Kingdom of Ends my freedom and yours are essentially the same - we 
both share in the universality of rational autonomy. Sartre puts this in terms of how 
‘my ideas and acts pass over into the objective.’ In other words what I do ends up 
out there in the world and to that extent ‘I am responsible for this.’  In a world of 20
mutual recognition and respect for free beings as ‘ends in themselves’ ethics is 
possible because ‘everyone is ethical.’ In such a world the ‘values reveal freedom 
at the same time as they surrender it.’ In a situation of ‘pure communication’ like 
love ‘any ordering of values has to lead to freedom’ because all values are sub-
sumed within the mutual recognition of each other’s freedom.  It is clear that, if 21
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we can genuinely experience each other as ‘pure’, free subjectivity in this way then 
‘objectivity disappears’.  What Sartre means by this is that everything depends on 22
how the action that embodies and realises our freedom is received by the other. As 
he puts it, ‘if freedoms willing to be free recognise my act as issuing from my free-
dom and take it up in freedom, I will my act both with my freedom and theirs too.’  23
The objectivity disappears in the sense that my act and the freedom it embodies is 
no longer an object for another to be confronted and overcome in some way. It is 
not a command or a proscription or a definitive value that is separable from my 
free activity. The problem is that the nature of the intersubjective relation is such 
that my act can be ‘taken up by consciousnesses that make it an object and make 
themselves objects in relation to it.’ In this way our acts pass over ‘into the objec-
tive’ and our freedom escapes us and acquires what Sartre calls here a ‘pseudo-
causality’.24
This is just one example of the deeper and more complex issue of the onto-
logical relation of one freedom to another and of our freedom itself. Sartre is surely 
right to see any genuine search for an ethics as being intimately bound to this ba-
sic ontological problem. So the issue becomes, ‘how do I experience the other in 
relation to my own freedom?’ If we are ‘detotalized totalities’ and ethics is a matter 
of the relation of one freedom to another and ‘freedom’ is the ultimate value then 
we can see another aspect of the ethical paradox that Sartre is grappling with. 
How can your freedom act as a ‘requisition’ on mine? This paradox is expressed in 
Sartre’s phrase, ‘To have the other in myself as another and yet as a free source 
of my acts.’  Part of the problem with any ethics of ‘transcendence’, in other 25
words an ethics where the values are exterior to and ‘surpass’ our freedom, is that 
our freedom becomes ‘inessential’. At best our freedom becomes the means to 
attain ends which are not our own. In this way, ‘the other in me’ can be a source of 
oppression and we are objectified. An alternative is an ethics of ‘inwardness’ .  26
This, Sartre thinks would be the ethics of ‘tastes’ and ‘subjective dispositions’ 
which, in so far as these ‘dispositions’ are ‘natural’, would ‘transform us into ob-
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jects ourselves.’ Our natural dispositions ‘are written in Nature just as the value-
objects were in heaven.’  27
We might ask at this stage what ‘conversion’ is supposed to achieve. Con-
version, Sartre tells us, leads to a recognition ‘of the spirit as detotalized-totality.’  28
As we work though the levels of reflection on our own freedom from ‘impure’ to 
‘pure’ reflection, we are forced to recognise our own contingency and responsibili-
ty. However, pure reflection ‘is already too late’ because ‘another element inter-
feres here, which is the Other.’ The Other has the capacity to objectify my freedom 
and in this way to negate it. The only way out of this is to appeal to the other as ‘a 
pure, free subjectivity.’ But for this appeal to succeed the other must reciprocate, 
but this reciprocation is not something that I can compel ‘and can only be the re-
sult of chance. For his bad will is fate for me and his good will chance.’  Conver29 -
sion is then the result of following through the process of reflection on our ontolog-
ical condition. In the attempt discover myself as free subjectivity, I also discover 
myself as ‘detotalized-totality’, in other words I discover myself as object for the 
other. In this way, ‘Pure reflection is good faith and as such an appeal to the good 
faith of the other person.’  As we have seen, ‘one cannot be converted alone’. 30
From what has already been said it should be apparent that the Cahiers 
open with some rich reflections on the problem of ethics that defy a glib summary. 
But the core theme is surely the paradox of ‘absurdity and necessity’. If ethics 
must ‘lead to freedom’ then the ethical imperative binds us as contingent free-
doms. Yet freedom can always overturn any particular ethical determination. Ethics 
operates in an atmosphere of ‘failure’ and ‘mystery’. ‘Mystery’ because ‘absolute 
knowledge is impossible’, as our actions pass over into the objective our activity in 
changing the world comes back to us as a ‘discovery’. ‘Failure’ because either 
there is an empty, abstract determination of pure subjectivity or we are already ob-
jectified by the values of the other. Ethics is always too ‘early’ or too ‘late’.   In this 31
way Sartre sets out the problem of developing an ethics of authentic freedom in 
which there would be the right kind of relationship between ‘interiority’ and ‘exteri-
ority’. In other words, between the two aspects of our being-in-the-world ; the 
spontaneity of free consciousness and the inertia of the world. An authentic ethics 
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of ‘conversion’ would be able to reconcile self and Other in a way that preserves 
freedom. 
What interests Sartre is the notion of ethics as the ‘idea’ of humanity. The 
dangers of ‘bad faith’ and objectification here are obvious. As Sartre puts it here, ‘I 
look at people passing by: I say, “human beings.” All at once I am a human being. 
But I have objectified my subjectivity, at the same time I have projected all my sub-
jectivity upon them.’  The problem is that any ethics worthy of the name must in 32
some way be ‘idea’. In Sartre’s phrase, it is ‘objectified subjective’. It is that idea of 
ourselves that we interiorise as a demand that comes from the other. ‘To place it 
within ourselves, to take it up again, is to place the objective within ourselves, to 
objectify ourselves within the heart of our creative subjectivity.’  The ethical idea is 33
then also an ‘historical movement’ since our ‘creative subjectivity’ then re-exteri-
orises the idea though action. There can then be a ‘peculiar action of the objecti-
fied-subjective’. In other words, the idea can then be taken up again as an object 
and act as a cause that determines our subjectivity from outside even though our 
subjectivity is at the heart of the idea. The idea oscillates between interiority and 
exteriority. I might first encounter it ‘as an object’ but as I take it up it ‘becomes 
once again a subjective project; my free project.’ But then ‘the idea closes in on 
me. It is objectified for others, it is an aspect of the in-itself.’  The idea can thus 34
define me and, to the extent that the idea can be ‘thought and lived by others’, a 
shared idea can unify us. However, it is a problematic unity in that the fact that we 
all think the same idea as a ‘plurality’ introduces ‘external sides’ within the unity. 
Furthermore, the idea can also become an object in that it exists for others who 
‘observe it from outside’, who ‘refuse to make the effort to enter into it.’  The dan35 -
ger is that my free project falls into bad faith as I assume the idea as a ‘shell of ex-
teriority’; the idea becomes ‘my character, my nature’ and my free project is alien-
ated. The key issue is how far there can be a genuine ‘communication of subjectiv-
ities in the idea.’ The problem thus applies to the ‘idea of man’. If the idea of man 
is an ‘ethical idea that one makes of oneself what man has to be’ we fall into the 
same trap whereby the idea becomes ‘character’. But the idea of humanity cannot 
be an object in this sense because it is ‘a deep-lying basis of absolute subjectivity 
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upon which our knowledge is determined.’  The consequence of this is that we 36
need to think in terms not of a ‘pseudo-objectivity’ of humanity but a veritable col-
lective subjectivity’. If we are detotalized-totalities, then we are ‘one’ in the sense 
that we all are subjectivities but not ‘unifiable’ in the sense that there can be no de-
finitive exterior determination of that subjectivity. As Sartre puts it here, ‘Man is the 
fundamentally unjustifiable basis of all justification.’  Yet, we must act. ‘There is 37
no abstract ethics. There is only an ethics in a situation and therefore it is con-
crete.’  38
With this Sartre makes the leap into ‘The Ambivalence of History and the 
Ambiguity of the Historical Fact’.  Sartre’s treatment of history in the Cahiers is 39
remarkably illuminating, which isn’t to say that it is completely systematic and 
clear. However, it is precisely the transitional and exploratory nature of his discus-
sion that gives it its significance in the wider context of his work. The core theme 
remains the ambiguities of freedom/necessity, interiority/exteriority and detotal-
ized-totality. The ‘idea’ of History also has the ‘peculiar action of the objectified-
subjective’. Were History to be the product of an absolute subject - Hegelian ‘Spir-
it’- then History would have a single meaning and direction. As the product of mul-
tiple freedoms each surpassing their situation History is itself a detotalized-totality. 
To the extent that any ‘agent thinks about History… [their] representation of History 
(ideology) becomes a historical factor.’ As soon as our attempt to unify our situa-
tion in terms of History - this is who we are and this is where we have come from 
and where we are going - is taken up by others, the totalisation of History as idea 
‘passes over to the objective’ to be yet again re-totalized and so on. In this way 
Sartre can broach different ways in which we can attempt to understand the nature 
of the unity of ‘Spirit’ that would constitute History. Certainly, if we ‘start from the 
absolute spirit containing within itself a diversity of facts’, then History is a matter 
of the ‘interiority’ of a ‘deciding spirit’ that ‘is entirely itself’ and there can therefore 
be direction and progress as the ordered unity of that absolute subject.  Yet even 40
for an ‘absolute spirit’ there is ‘scission’ both from within and without. The interior 
unity of judgement is also ‘part of the totality as one active element within it’, in 
other words, one moment of the absolute subject can judge another ‘historically’. 
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Equally, any judgement that can be made on the ‘closed totality’ of the absolute 
subject ‘at the end of history’ , is necessarily an external judgement on that totality 
and its ‘lived history’ is ‘transformed into a history-object’ by ‘another History from 
whose point of view one judges this Spirit.’In this way, ‘whether from the inside or 
outside, in lived History judgement is historical.’  41
In essence the problem is the relationship between unity and freedom. If 
there is to be a ‘history’ there must be a certain kind of unity and the issue is how 
we can pass over to the universal. It seems as if the unity must either come from 
the interior unity of some kind of universal subject or the exterior unity supplied by 
some kind of ‘objective law’ derived from the ‘repetitions’ of activities where the 
‘identity of circumstances leads to almost the same reactions.’  Neither of these 42
extremes properly captures ‘the reality of inter-subjective temporality.’  This is so 43
because ‘historical action is efficacious only if the idea becomes a thing.’  Each 44
attempt at giving a unity to History in turn becomes an object for another. Yet this 
attempt to freely ‘make history’ relies on others to ‘provide its value’. The fact that 
‘every human being…can take up a separatist view of history and talk about uni-
versal History’  means that ‘at the heart of History, each historical being is at the 
same time an ahistorical absolute.’  But, in so far as we are all part of a detotal45 -
ized-totality, then we are all ‘absolute’ within History itself. This means, as Sartre 
puts it, that ‘the existence-in-relationship of each person makes this absolute rela-
tive from a certain point of view.’ So freedom is irreducible at the heart of History 
but there is never an identity between individual consciousness and History itself. 
History is always also the activity of ‘the other’. Not only can another free subjec-
tivity take up my totalisation as their own and in their own way but there is also the 
operation of ‘chance’ in the form of the ‘historical threshold’ that allows one action 
to affect another and the ‘physical aspect’ of history.  46
There is always the possibility therefore that there is no History in the sense 
of a single, unified direction and meaning that results in a single totalisation and 
yet there are still historical ideas and these themselves are attempts to synthesise 
a unity out of multiplicity. Our representations of History itself in terms of its nature 
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and ends, or what Sartre calls here the ‘historical myth’, ‘is itself History’. The idea 
of History can then undergo a series of developments and become ‘the whole set 
of acts by which mankind decides about the essence of man for itself and for oth-
ers in and through History.’  The problem with this is that Sartre, at this point at 47
least, denies the possibility of a dialectical movement towards the realisation of a 
‘unique and collective historical consciousness’.  This is because, at this stage, 48
he understands any true dialectical process as already supposing a prior unity. In 
other words we might seek to act historically by putting forward an image of what 
humanity can be or is to be and yet, if such an idea is to have an historical action, 
it must be taken up by other freedoms who objectify the idea and make them-
selves passive objects in relation to it or surpass it towards their own ends. Given 
the way in which Sartre understands the historical at this stage, History is a deeply 
ambiguous context that reflects the underlying scission in consciousness itself but 
also goes beyond it. As the product of free activity taken up by the other, diverted 
and distorted by the ‘peculiar action of the objectified-subjective’ and the materiali-
ty of the world, History itself is ‘subjectivity without a subject’.  Every historical fact 49
‘is a situation’ and every historical event ‘always leaves a residue.’ Historical action 
is always a ‘concrete transcendence’ - in so far as ‘each consciousness is an 
agent of History, it ‘historicises itself’ but we act in the world of others and the effi-
cacy and concrete reality of our action depends on the other.  Each act is ‘a pro50 -
posal’ therefore and every historical fact, event or historical object contains within 
it ‘the inertia of the exteriority of nature’.51
It is under these conditions that we need to think about values and ethics. In 
some ways this is the same as considering the notion of ‘progress’. This, too, 
‘springs up within History’. If this is so then for ‘progress to be one of the meanings 
of History’, it must also be lived - ‘sought for and suffered’.  In other words, 52
progress might be thought of as some order inherent in the externality of the ‘eter-
nal’. But the notion of progress is itself an historical factor and in this way 
‘progress’ is ‘really recovered as progress by the progressive project.’ Thus 
‘progress’ is also a ‘proposal’ and this applies too to any form of ‘partial progress’ 
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which is ‘absolute within its own domain’ like science and technology.  Historically 53
speaking, we might say, scientific progress is a kind of paradigm since it is con-
cerned with the ‘real’ in the sense that technological competence and the means it 
grants us for overcoming our practical difficulties has a certain kind of universal 
reality - this is what we can do. But here again, we see that scientific progress is 
still a ‘proposal’ to ‘human subjectivity’ to be surpassed in a variety of ways. One 
only needs to think of the current forms of anti-scientism to see this whether it be 
the ‘anti-vaxxer’ movement or the promise of AI or whatever. In this way, the mo-
ment that is totalised as progressive is ‘deprogressivised’ and we end up with ‘de-
progressivised-progress’.  This is simply a product of the basic ontological struc54 -
ture of the ‘detotalised-totality’. There are profound consequences for ethics in all 
this. Every idea is an active proposal towards unity but must always be realised 
under conditions of multiplicity and separation. In other words, we might well at-
tempt to realise a set of transcendent, eternal values but ‘if concrete human life is 
an undertaking within History’ then ethics necessarily operates at the level of the 
concrete and unites and gives meaning to the total project. Ethics is therefore at 
the heart of ‘the historical and historicising goal [which] is always the unity of con-
sciousnesses.’  The problem is that this unity cannot be kind of abstract event 55
within the compass of a single subjectivity that posits itself as universal in the 
Kantian sense; this is pure abstraction and idealism. But nor could it be dialectical 
movement towards unity by a universal subject overcoming its own internal nega-
tions in the Hegelian sense and this is because ‘History is not the history of one 
freedom but rather of an indefinite plurality of freedoms.’  Nor, too, could it be the 56
simple operation of materiality and the ‘economic’ since the historical event could 
never be reduced to pure materiality in its foundation - ‘the action of what is eco-
nomic is total and action on what is economic is likewise total.’ The implication is 57
now that ‘an historical ethics’ must address ‘the nature of action’ and the ‘ambigui-
ty’ of the historical event and the historical collective. At this point Sartre therefore 
shifts his analysis towards a range of themes that will preoccupy him into the Cri-
tique and beyond. 
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The problem is how to find a ‘unity’ that preserves freedom within the ‘opac-
ity’ of History. Part of what this means is that for any freedom that is in the process 
of ‘making History’ there is always an indeterminate future simply because any his-
torical agency is always subject to the activity of the ‘other’. In other words the 
idea is a proposal to the ‘other’ and there is the requirement that the ‘idea’ be in-
scribed in some way in ‘materiality’ and the ‘chance’ that this introduces simply be-
cause the intention necessarily becomes separate from the actualisation of the 
idea. Furthermore, in this way, any proposal of unity itself becomes what Sartre 
calls ‘the myth of unification’ . But, as he has made clear, History itself operates 58
at the level of ‘myth’, if this means that any idea can unite in some provisional way 
as long as it is taken up by other freedoms in such a way that it can be inscribed in 
materiality. Yet, of course, merely doing so introduces another element of distortion 
which is the operation of any further round of free adoption of the situation as exi-
gency. In this way Sartre approaches more and more closely the concept of the 
practico-inert. At this stage everything is moving towards a certain kind of irresolv-
able dialectic of inside and outside. Every determination of situation is a product of 
freedom but freedom is always situated in the sense that it must be a relation to its 
situation and therefore a relation to the other. This relation is necessarily a form of 
‘alienation’ since my ‘surpassing’ of my situation is in turn ‘surpassed’. Again, this 
simply another way of characterising the detotalised-totality. I interiorise my exter-
nality and re-exterorise this through my agency which then becomes a proposal for 
others which then becomes a further externality for me to further re-interiorise. It is 
in this context that Sartre begins his extended engagement with Hegel and with 
Marxism - although at this point it is Historical Materialism more specifically. The 
problem as Sartre sees it is that, in Hegel’s case, there is the prior unity of Abso-
lute Spirit overcoming divisions within itself; ’For Hegel, the negation comes from 
within the thesis and it is united to that thesis that it negates by an internal 
relation.’ In the Marxist case, there is ‘a materialistic monism’ where the economic 59
substructure subsumes all else and History is simply the ‘repetition’ of the econom-
ic producing the economic. Of course, Sartre does not deny that there can be both 
internal and external unities and an associated dialectic within each. His point is 
rather that in each case the dialectic operates within a partial, closed totality that 
can be surpassed and detotalised. For example, ‘if we conserve both human free-
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dom and the primordial importance of the economic [then] lived History has no 
outside, but every essential invention retrospectively communicates an outside 
and an external passivity to it…We are therefore in the untenable situation that 
nothing comes from the outside to cut off our efforts so long as they are lived in 
freedom, and yet these efforts have their destiny outside themselves.’  This ir60 -
reducible contradiction between unity in interiority and external, structural unity has 
the consequence that any ‘historical myth’ that aims at totality will itself contradict 
‘historical reality’ because ‘all historical action can only be finite…and that it 
presents itself with a goal situated at infinity.’ This is the source of all the various 61
ambiguities and contradictions that Sartre highlights - the discontinuous-continuity, 
the non-historical historical, the subjectivity without a subject, objectivity in the sub-
jective, subjectivity through objectivity, the universal in the singular, the singular in 
the universal. History becomes a kind of pseudo-subject that can never be identi-
cal with itself, it is always ‘other’.  This pseudo-subject shares in the freedom of 62
the individual subjects that make it through their free agency. In this way History is 
‘invention’ and creativity but because we are dealing with ‘a plurality of freedoms’ 
and the operation of materiality, separation and ‘chance’, as we have seen, then 
History always ‘gets alienated from itself in becoming conscious of itself.’ History 
‘envelops its own myth and true History gets made through the myth of History.’  63
In this way Historical action is the search for a unifying, transhistorical idea 
that itself gets drawn back into History. In so far as History shares some of the 
characteristics of the ‘plurality’ of the freedoms that make it and in so far as History 
can have an end state then History can also share something of the contradiction 
of the in-itself-for-itself. ‘History is inhabited by the myth of unification, therefore it 
makes itself into another.  But precisely other than unification; that is, it is the pro-
jection on the not-one of the one in the process of becoming, everything gets or-
ganised towards unity (dictatorships, authoritarian parties, One World) and every-
thing fails.’ This failure is bound up with the fact that ‘every Totality is a totality for 
subjectivities…one makes man into an object for himself.’ Sartre then goes on to 
raise and consider a range of ways in which we might seek to realise this totalised 
humanity historically. For example, there is the ‘American way’: this is the unity of 
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‘the majority’ whereby each individual is an interchangeable part of the ‘represen-
tation of the majority’. The individual is alienated into the ‘general’, ‘average’ totali-
ty of public opinion unified in the mass media and ‘written in the statistics’. In 
Sartre’s pithy phrase, ‘each American is a potential Rousseau’.  There is the ‘Dic64 -
tatorial way’ whereby the unity is expressed through the ‘symbolic totality’ of the 
party and the leader. Yet here the ‘single consciousness’ of the leader renders all 
other subjectivities ‘inessential’ in relation to the totality and we must discover our 
thoughts as objects in the leader.  Whatever unity we might propose collapses 65
back into some form of objective separation once it falls back into the ‘trough of 
history’. In this way, Sartre thinks, the driving force of History once it is ‘discovered’ 
by a ‘multiplicity of freedoms’ is to ‘intend its end’. In other words to incarnate with-
in it a total unity of humanity. ‘Our epoch by hypostasising the historical Project 
that it uncovers and extends to the infinity of the Future, uncovers the meaning of 
History in its end (in both senses of this term); that is, in the realisation of the Total-
ity.’  Thus the ‘end’ of History is both the cessation of a certain kind of progressive 66
movement - in the sense of the completion of the development of order within a 
system -  and the achievement of a final end state as a goal. As we have seen, the 
problem is that we are dealing with a detotalised-totality and not a single, absolute 
subject becoming conscious of itself. In this sense, the only ‘Totality, as Hegel saw, 
would be the Absolute/Subject. But this means exactly one subject or, if you will, 
the real and ontological fusion of every consciousness into one.’ The consequence 
of all of this is that the History of a plurality of freedoms is always the product of 
‘an inequality between the Totality and the individual’  67
The implication for ethics is that ‘if the end of History is supposed to be the 
advent of Ethics’ then Ethical unity as a transhistorical end cannot be directly con-
structed ‘from within History’.  Instead ‘it requires that everyone be moral at the 68
same time, which presupposes an infinite chance relative to each individual con-
sciousness.’ In other words, each free being must choose itself as an ethical abso-
lute from within the ‘density’ and ‘opacity’ of their historical situation and in their 
‘concrete singularity as a concrete end.’ . And they must do this in the same way, 69
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at the same time and in such a way that they both preserve and transcend their 
freedom and the freedom of the other whilst also being concretely within History. 
Sartre’s issue with the Kantian self-determination as a universal subject is essen-
tially that such a universal freedom is ahistorical all the way through and in this 
way History has an end before it has even begun. His engagement with Hegel is 
much more complex and sustained simply because there is ‘movement’ within 
Hegel’s Absolute Spirit and, in one sense, ‘if there is a History, it is Hegel’s’ . Yet 70
the movement in Hegel is always internal to the Absolute subject as it comes to 
complete self-understanding. As far as Sartre is concerned, the Hegelian system is 
bounded by ‘contemplation’ and all the ‘activity’, ‘suffering’ and ‘existential atti-
tudes’ are merely ‘moments in the system’. Within the system each ‘absolute’ indi-
vidual subject is merely ‘relative’ to the whole. But man ‘is absolute insofar as he 
acts -in the world and among others, in his moment - he is precisely absolute in so 
far as he historicises himself in History.’  Yet, as we have seen, we are all abso71 -
lute in relation to each other within History itself. In this way, ‘this absolute is rela-
tive’, since our freedom can be transcended by the other and so on.  ‘Spirit’ is 72
therefore the product of individual consciousnesses ‘engaged in multiple relation-
ships with other consciousnesses’. As such, Spirit is always the ‘activity of all the 
others’ and what each one of us must surpass in surpassing ourselves towards 
our ends. If individual subjectivities are ontologically foundational then ‘the 
Hegelian dialectic will immediately be falsified’ since Spirit can never be ‘for-
itself’.  73
  The Cahiers, whilst being a complex and diffuse text is programmatic to the 
extent that Sartre does indeed set out the context of his thinking in the first portion 
of it. As always with Sartre, the ontology underlies and conditions the discussion. 
The search for an ethics is also a search for its ontological ground which is surely 
as it should be. The problem is that the ontology suggests that ethics in the sense 
of an ‘infinite end’ must appear within the ‘detotalized-totality’ of history. The ab-
surdity and necessity of ethics is exactly that it is always finite action towards and 
infinite end and always under the condition of being ‘other than itself’. In a sense 
Sartre is working in the Cahiers in a space between Kant and Hegel but also be-
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yond them. As we have seen, both of these thinkers posit a unity that is, in their 
different idioms, still a kind of unity of interiority. That is to say, that there is a 
choice of ‘self’, either as the universal subject or as the self-realisation of Absolute 
Spirit; either way, we are always inside. Sartre’s great merit as an ethical thinker is 
to seriously attempt to address what he calls the ‘quasi-dialectic’ of interiority and 
exteriority. The great paradox of ethics is that it is the necessarily free choice of 
self in a world that is already the concretion of choice. In so far as we might talk 
about ethics as purely abstract in the sense that it is defined by ‘the purely formal 
recognition’ of the ‘universal personhood’ of another then this is ethics outside of 
‘real history.’  It becomes ‘the goal without a goal’.  But any ‘concrete goal that 74 75
the historical agent proposes’ already contains within it ‘a certain conception of 
man and of values’.76
What Sartre does here in the Cahiers, to a surprising degree for those who 
might still be approaching his thinking largely through the lens of Being and Noth-
ingness and the lecture ‘Existentialism is a Humanism’, is to place the discussion 
firmly within the context of society and history. He focuses on the ambiguity of col-
lective subjectivity held together by the ‘social idea’ which is created as an ‘idea 
object’ . However, a social idea is always ‘guaranteed’ by others and ‘I enter into’ 
this idea.  Since freedom is ontologically irreducible and we are dealing with a 77
plurality of freedoms, then the ‘idea’ is ‘internal objectivity’ but also ‘external sub-
jectivity’; it is ‘me inside outside’ in the realm of the other. Freedom is both creative 
and alienated since for it to become concrete it must always ‘be inscribed’ in the 
world and taken up by others. The darker side of this is, of course, that my work in 
the world always returns to me as exteriority, as the image of myself in the other, 
as ‘destiny’ and ‘objective necessity’  and we become ‘a situation’ for ourselves.  78
To some extent then we are still the victims of the ‘look’ and a ‘society looks as me 
as society’; as the ‘undifferentiated gaze of others’.  On the positive side, if free79 -
dom is ontologically basic then freedom is always also ‘creation’. What returns to 
me as exteriority is also an occasion for a ‘new beginning’. Yet since we are al-
ready being-in-the-world then creation is always the creation of myself ‘in the di-
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mension of the world’ and ‘human reality is the creation of itself outside of itself.’ 
We create ourselves outside by ‘creating the world’ but this is not something we 
can do by ourselves as individuals; we must necessarily ‘make recourse to the 
other’.  In this way Sartre enriches his treatment of freedom as a process of recip80 -
rocal ‘incitement’ and ‘proposal’ to the other through the ‘gift’ of our freedom. 
Through creation, invention and affirmation, we ‘grant being in giving it’ but such 
creation always runs the risk of failure and can be ‘placed in danger by another 
freedom’.  Since we are always forced to realise our freedom through the ‘inter81 -
mediary’ of the world we are not discussing a formal, abstract freedom here, in-
stead we must give ‘our freedom as the foundation of the being that manifests it-
self to me’.  The issue is how we should ‘give’ our freedom in the light of the free82 -
dom of the other. As Sartre puts it here, ‘the problem is to rediscover the concrete 
in the universal.’  The kind of abstract recognition we might grant to another as 83
‘pure, universal freedom’ fails to recognise their concrete particularity and there-
fore pushes into exteriority the very freedom it seeks to recognise. Instead ‘a free-
dom is an infinitely concrete and qualified enterprise that has to be recognised in 
its enterprise.’  The demand for recognition becomes an appeal to ‘help me in my 84
concrete operation because it is this operation that is my freedom.’ As far as Sartre 
is concerned true creation follows from a non-accessory reflection that ‘just as the 
world is the intermediary between the For-itself and the Me, so too it is the re-
quired intermediary between two freedoms in search of each other.’  The ‘work of 85
art’ is an appeal to the other to collaborate in the process of creation by recognis-
ing my concrete creative act both as value and as freedom.  At this point we are 86
in a position to see the curious mixture of themes that are further explored in the 
rest of the text. 
Inevitably we must confront ‘violence’ and ‘oppression’ and both derive from 
the ontology of freedom or rather they depend ontologically on freedom. Violence 
is not force as an operation on an inert world or merely the treatment of another 
freedom purely as an object but is always concerned with the relation between 
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freedoms as freedom. In this way violence is intimately connected with oppression 
as Sartre understands it. Violence is a ‘choice of means’, a value and a ‘concep-
tion of the world’.  Essentially violence is the imposition on another freedom of an 87
external end to which their freedom becomes merely the inessential means. As 
Sartre puts it, ‘to make use of the facticity of another person and the objective from 
the outside to determine the subjective to turn itself into an inessential means of 
reaching the objective.’  As such violence is a specific form of the more general 88
intersubjective condition of oppression - ‘oppression is an internal metamorphosis 
of my freedom which is brought about by another’s freedom.’  Of course, given 89
‘the dialectic of freedoms’ then violence and oppression are always a possibility in 
human relations. The implications of this for Sartre’s treatment of ethics are pro-
found. If ethics operates at the level of the universal then the ethical demand al-
ways appears to us as the demand of the universal ‘other’ which then imposes on 
my particular freedom as what I must be - it is always the ‘other in me’. The key 
issue as always for Sartre is the status of the individual’s particular and concrete 
freedom. His fundamental point in his critical engagement with both Hegel and 
Kant is that each thinker in their different ways alienates particular freedoms into 
the universal which then returns to those freedoms as the Other and oppresses 
them. The problem, as we have seen, is that neither the Kantian universal subject 
nor the Hegelian Absolute Spirit is a genuine totality, instead we are always deal-
ing with an abstraction from or a universalisation of concrete freedoms. In either 
case the freedom of the individual becomes the ‘inessential’ means to an end that 
is not their own. The ‘ethics of duty’ is considered by Sartre to be alienated and 
oppressive in this sense. Duty is ‘obligation’ and ‘demand’ and as such is a univer-
sal and unconditioned freedom which turns back on my particular freedom to con-
dition it. In this way obligation is ‘the look that cannot be looked at’ and it is ‘not 
freedom as a choice to be made in some situation, but freedom as a choice al-
ready made.’  Part of Sartre’s point is that wherever there is a ‘hierarchy of free90 -
doms’ there is the possibility, or perhaps even, the inevitability of oppression. In 
the case of duty we are oppressed by freedom itself as the unconditioned freedom 
that cannot be surpassed. Duty is always the demand of the absolute other but 
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crucially, since we are not dealing here with some other particular freedom which 
fixes us in the ‘look’ but can itself be surpassed, it is the other as universal free-
dom itself. Duty is the ‘freedom behind my freedom’ and it subsumes my concrete, 
situated freedom ‘from behind’ by a kind of paradox whereby my freedom freely 
chooses freedom already chosen by the universal other. There is freedom ‘every-
where’ yet our particular freedom is ‘mystified and alienated’ and our particular 
freedom is merely the inessential means to the realisation of the ‘absolute end’ as 
freedom.  His point is still that there is a hierarchy of freedoms and that the basis 91
of the heteronomy here is not freedom determined from the outside by the causal 
inertia of the world but of a particular freedom allowing itself to be surpassed to-
wards another freedom. If our concrete freedom chooses absolute freedom as ‘the 
other in me’ and therefore adopts the absolute end of the other as its own then, he 
suggests, this is my freedom affirming its autonomy ‘at the moment of total het-
eronomy.’  This is also ‘mystification’, ‘alienation’, ‘force’, ‘violence’ and ‘oppres92 -
sion’. 
This structure applies not just in the context of a Kantian notion of duty but 
in any circumstances where there is an alienation of or a hierarchy of freedoms. 
For example, any form of ‘sovereignty’ in the sense of a total unity capable of cre-
ating an order of duty and obligation will participate in the paradoxical ‘circuit of 
freedom’ whereby freedom alienates itself as ‘other’ which then returns to it as 
freedom in the other. As Sartre puts it, ‘The ethics of duty is in fact a type of human 
and social relationship, that of alienation that spins in a circle, of slavery without a 
master, of the sacrifice of man to the human. The reason for it is the structure of 
humanity as detotalised totality.’  Everything rests, therefore, on the quality of how 93
freedom is recognised within the context of the detotalised totality. If there is a uni-
fying theme to the Cahiers then this is it. In fact, the major discovery of conversion 
through non-accessory reflection is the mutual relation of our freedoms as deto-
talised totality. It also lies behind Sartre’s extended engagement with the Hegelian 
dialectic of master and slave. Ultimately the ‘existential conditions of oppression’ 
derive from ‘its ontological conditions’.  Oppression can only exist under condi94 -
tions of freedom, freedom is everywhere and ‘there is complicity between the op-
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pressor and the oppressed’. Between the master and slave Sartre sees what calls 
a ‘lateral’, ‘horizontal’ dialectic whereby each party is locked into a system of de-
sire and a circuit of means and relative ends.  Under such conditions, any totali95 -
sation will necessarily involve a ‘submission’ of freedom to force. If freedom is 
everywhere then at any point that ‘the plurality of consciousnesses’ finds ‘the 
union that will turn a detotalised totality into a true totality’, it will in fact be based 
on ‘the look’ and what Sartre calls here the ‘alienated cogito’: the ‘Sovereign-will’ 
that unites is always built on ‘the ruin of our personalities’.96
This brings us to one aspect of the ethical crux of the Cahiers. In the con-
text of an extended discussion of various forms of intersubjective ethical commu-
nication such as ‘the prayer’ and the ‘demand’, all of which involve some kind of 
abasement or alienation of freedom and as such some element of ‘bad faith’, we 
reach the ‘appeal’. The ‘authentic appeal’ is an ethical communication between 
one ‘personal freedom in situation’ to another ‘personal freedom in situation.’ Cru-
cially it involves both the ‘full recognition of the detotalised-totality’ and a non-
alienating relation of ‘comprehension’.  As always, everything comes down to the 97
relation of one freedom to another and the relation of that particular freedom to it-
self. ‘Comprehension’ here means the experience of the other and the synthetic 
unity of their means and ends as a creative, practical agent in the world. If ‘to ex-
plain is to refer to causes,’ then ‘to comprehend is to clarify by ends’.  Whilst 98
Sartre’s discussion here is not always as coherent as we might hope, it is clear 
that his overall argumentative purpose is to articulate a position beyond the basic 
conflict of freedoms where one ‘closed off and subjective totality’ confronts another 
and our only hope for a vindication of our individual freedom is to surpass the free 
agency of another freedom towards our own ends. In this way, ‘the Other becomes 
transcended transcendence and the pursuit of his end becomes a fact.’  At this 99
basic and antagonistic level, it is obvious that the only values that count are mine 
as the ‘subjective totality’ that unifies the situation with my ‘look’. To use Sartre’s 
classic example of the person running for the bus, which features again in the 
Cahiers, he tells us that we can simply ‘see’ this as something that is happening. 
As I look from my seat on the bus I can see this situation as simply ‘someone run-
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ning for the bus’. At one level I understand what they are doing - they are running 
for the bus - but at another level, and this is the level that concerns him now, I do 
not comprehend. Everything rests upon how I take up the end that is revealed by 
the situation. It is obviously not the case that just because I am on the bus that 
some sort of universal end of ‘being on the bus’ has been realised, although I am 
indeed on the bus and a bunch of others are too. The point is that the specific oth-
er person, in their specific situation, needs to be on the bus and the issue is how. 
At this basic level of reciprocity, ‘the only authentic form of willing here consists in 
wanting the end to be realised by the other. And wanting here consists in engaging 
oneself in the operation. But not to do it oneself, rather to modify the situation so 
that the other can do it.’  I press the buzzer to alert the driver to stop the bus so 100
that the other can get on! 
On this disarmingly simple basis, Sartre goes on to outline an intersubjec-
tive relation that goes beyond the ‘original conflict’. Inherent in the structure of ‘the 
appeal’ is a relation between freedoms that is mutual and non-alienating. The key 
is the way in which Sartre considers that one freedom can be the vehicle for the 
achievement of the other’s end all the while as freedom. In responding authentical-
ly to another free agent ‘in difficulty’, whilst ‘I am his instrument in my very facticity, 
and he surpasses me toward his end’, because ‘I want this end only as the other 
wants it’ and ‘I am a starting point’ through which the other’s freedom moves to-
wards its end then there will be ‘a structure that is mine’ in the achievement of the 
end.  In this kind of basic recognition of and response to the practical agency of 101
another Sartre sees the possibility of a non-conflictual mutuality of freedoms by 
which ‘the closed off and subjective totality’, is replaced by ‘an open diversity’.  102
This is a consequence of how the other’s freedom in the appeal and my free re-
sponse to adopt their end as mine by wanting it for the other reflects both the ‘pro-
longing of my freedom in the dimension of otherness’ and how the other sees their 
freedom as operating through and ‘emanating’ from my own.  In this way Sartre 103
claims that we need no longer think in terms of conflict ‘where each For-itself de-
nies that it is the Other and constitutes the other as an object’. Instead the ‘nega-
tion no longer has the sense of going against but of going further’. Operating 
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through my free commitment to help, the other ‘bears my will toward the end that 
he freely wants.’ By helping the other, I have ‘realised an operation in which I have 
projected myself’.  104
In the ethical structure of the ‘appeal’ as Sartre presents it there is therefore 
a developing notion of the ‘City of Ends’. The maxim of my authentic choice to help 
the other is that ‘the world have an infinity of free and finite futures each of which is 
directly projected by a free will and indirectly upheld by the willing of all the others, 
in that each wants the concrete freedom of the other.’  Central to how Sartre 105
wants us to understand this notion is that we must always start from the concrete, 
particular, situated individual who, as creative freedom in the world, makes value 
exist. In Sartre’s terms, the intention of an end is also the creation of value. Each 
end is a creative expression of a situated freedom as concrete operation to be re-
alised. Freedom as an abstract, universal value is obviously what underlies the 
value of any particular end but that abstract freedom has no real existence apart 
from the operation of concrete, particular free beings in the world. Indeed, as we 
have seen, the reification of freedom as a universal, necessary absolute - as in the 
Kantian universal subject, for example - is, in Sartre’s terms, both ‘mystification’ 
and ‘alienation’ and leads to oppression by conditioning the individual’s freedom 
from the exterior. In the structure of the ‘appeal’ Sartre points to a particular kind of 
recognition and reciprocity of freedoms that attempts to avoid both the reification 
as universal absolute and the ‘closed off subjective totalities’ which are always in 
conflict. ‘In every appeal there is a gift’ and in every appeal there is also a ‘proposi-
tion’ and ultimately a ‘request’.  There is a ‘gift’ of freedom on both sides in that 106
the appeal is made by one free being to another as a situated freedom. In this way 
‘the true appeal is a risk’ and ‘a refusal to consider the original conflict between 
freedoms by way of the look as something impossible to surpass.’ I freely give my 
end to the other in ‘total gratuity, without shame’; in other words I do not attempt 
either to condition the other from the exterior by a moral ‘demand’ nor do I ‘abase 
myself’ by attempting to induce pity in the other as the object of a ‘prayer’.  Reci107 -
procally, the other can now freely adopt my end and engage their facticity in the 
world to complete it. This, too, is a gift. At the heart of the appeal therefore there 
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are two fundamental principles. First that there must be mutual recognition of free-
dom, not in the abstract but ‘in terms of its own ends, along with the difficulties it 
experiences and in its finitude.’ Secondly, ‘freedom exists only in giving, it devotes 
itself to giving itself.’108
In this way, then, the appeal reveals a basic ethical condition that is neither 
a choice of self as a subjective totality nor a choice of world as an inert structure. It 
does, of course, whilst being at its core a ‘promise of reciprocity’ between one per-
son and another, contain ‘the outlines of a world where each person can call upon 
all the others.’  It does, also, run the risk of various forms of ‘bad faith’ and inau109 -
thenticity; not least the tendency of socio-economic conditions to confine the 
scope of reciprocity to ‘ties of caste or class’ and thereby reinforce them. Yet, cru-
cially, there is always the underlying structure of the ‘authentic appeal’ which ‘ad-
dresses itself to freedom’ as the consciousness ‘of being a surpassing of every in-
equality of condition toward a human world where any appeal of anyone will al-
ways be possible.’ The goal is ‘a supple and shifting unity in diversity, a diversity 
that will never be a transcended given but rather a conscious intention to unite, 
and that will itself be in question in its being.’  Significantly, it is at this point that 110
Sartre raises the issue of ‘common ends’. Given that we can overcome the original 
conflict in the kind of authentic recognition contained in the appeal then we can 
also propose common ends, in other words I do not just appeal to the other to help 
realise my end as mine, ‘rather I present him with the concrete content of an 
end.’  This can then become the basis of ‘a transcendent unification through the 111
common outcome of the operation and the creation of the We.’ Here his discussion 
is obviously balanced on the cusp of a shift into a different register which is, of 
course, taken up in the Critique. For the moment Sartre postpones his treatment of 
issue to ‘elsewhere’ and embarks on an analysis of what he calls the ‘ontological 
conditions of oppression’.  112
As we have seen, ‘oppression’ is always the product of freedom - which is 
simply to say that you cannot oppress if you are not free and you cannot oppress 
what is not free! But oppression is also a reciprocal relation in which neither party 
correctly recognises both the freedom of the other and their own. This is the 
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source of the ‘complicity between oppressor and oppressed.  Yet Sartre is not 113
claiming here that oppression is an inevitable and necessary consequence of 
freedom, although it can sometimes seem that freedom is merely ‘free to choose 
the sauce with which it will be eaten’, rather everything depends on how freedom 
is lived out at the concrete level of the situation.  Indeed one key shift that Sartre 114
is making here in the Cahiers is to address, however partially and hesitantly, the 
diachronic dimension of the social and the political rather than just the synchronic 
confrontation of one freedom with another. The worst form of oppression is the 
manipulation of another’s freedom against them in the form of the ‘trick’, the ‘ruse’ 
and the ‘trap’ - another freedom uses our own, temporally structured agency 
against us. But social oppression is also an exclusion from possibility through the 
structuring of the situation by other freedoms. Sartre’s long discussion of ‘stupidity 
and ignorance’ explores these themes.  As we have said, everything comes 115
down to how ‘I grasp my freedom’ in reciprocity with others and ‘oppression is an 
internal metamorphosis of my freedom which is brought about by another’s free-
dom’.  As Sartre puts it, ‘In a team where everyone has his place, there is no 116
dumb fool’.  So just as freedom can reciprocally oppress so it can reciprocally 117
liberate. Oppression is both ‘one moment in the dialectic of freedoms’ and at the 
same time ‘an historical fact’  Developing his theme, Sartre claims that the ‘social 118
world’ is ‘a perpetual dialectic of three concepts’. There is the immediate experi-
ence of the absolute freedom of the other in ‘the inter individual emotions’ - hate, 
love, recognition etc.; there is ‘fatality or fate’ which appears as we attempt to act 
through our facticity in the world and, finally, there is ‘determinism’. This last is a 
key notion for Sartre in that the determinism he has in mind is, in fact, itself the 
product of freedom. It appears through ‘the turning of one freedom against anoth-
er’ whereby the option preferred by the dominant group is interiorised as necessity 
for all. This is indeed ‘bad faith’ and ‘mystification’ through which ‘determinism be-
comes a weapon of oppression.’  119
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At this stage in his discussion Sartre launches into a detailed critique of a 
certain form of dialectical materialism using the debate between Engels and 
Dühring as a foil. The great merit of Sartre’s criticisms is that he demands that op-
pression be seen not merely as a necessary starting point of an ‘objective’ dia-
lectic but rather as the ‘historical fact’ of a ‘choice to oppress’.   Oppression al120 -
ways ‘takes place within a conception of the world’, he tells us, and any ‘objective 
dialectic’ will still reflect the ‘hidden presence of values’ . Without entering into 121
the details, his fundamental point is that the kind of materialist perspective that he 
imputes to Engels will always move incoherently between a necessary determin-
ism and the ‘smuggling in of values’.  The danger is that either ‘man is an 122
epiphenomenon’ or we end up positing the end of a ‘total society’ the value of 
which can only be given by already ‘assuming the point of view of totality’.  The 123
incoherence stems, Sartre claims, from ‘the absurd effort of joining together 
mechanism and dialectic into one synthesis’.  The question ‘Why does man op124 -
press man?’ remains unanswered. The economic facts are ‘mute’ and the issue 
can only be ‘interpreted from the perspective of interest’.  This leads Sartre natu125 -
rally into an analysis of ‘Desire’ and ‘Praxis’. 
Sartre works his way up from the basic ontological analysis of ‘primitive de-
sire’ and ‘primitive society’ where there exists an original ‘diffuse oppression’. This 
is the product of both the way freedom relates to its object in desire - my freedom 
returns to me as other in the object - and the fact that in such an undifferentiated 
society we are all the same as the other.  With the introduction of more complexi126 -
ty both in terms of technology, property relations and social structure oppression 
can be ‘transmitted’. At this level, ‘oppression is an event, an act of human re-
sponsibility’.  It can take place only on the basis of both a material and an onto127 -
logical condition. The tool does not itself determine the relation of oppression; in-
stead the tool is what mediates an oppressive relation already chosen. Sartre’s 
essential point is that behind all forms of oppression there is always a concrete re-
lation which itself is situated within the wider social field. In this respect, every re-
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sponse of the slave to the oppression of the master is a real expression of free-
dom in that it is an attempt to live out the impossibility of being human. In another 
sense, whatever the slave does is already alienated in the master as ‘other’ since 
the master can turn resignation back upon the slave as an ethics of slavery. If it be 
a question of a violent response then, at the limit, the slave’s humanity can only be 
vindicated at the cost of their destruction.  128
Notebook II recapitulates a number of themes we have already discussed 
but also takes them further. History begins in ‘primitive alienation’ and then devel-
ops in terms of the ‘idea as nature’. But freedom is always its source and can 
therefore ‘burst apart ideology’.  This is the moment of pure, unconditioned free129 -
dom of the ‘apocalypse’. This then falls back in its turn into alienation. The basic 
consequence of the de-totalised totality is that there is both ‘recognition’ and 
‘alienation’. Yet, as we have seen, ‘only a freedom can be a destiny for a freedom’. 
History is the absolute within which a series of finite projects aim at ‘infinite hu-
manity’. Yet on the other hand, ‘man makes a finite history through infinite 
projects’.  This is the essential problem of the ‘meaning of history’ in so far as it 130
is not decided from the exterior by an extra-historical observer. It is also intimately 
connected with the question of how far each one of us can become the means for 
an absolute end. Certainly, as Sartre points out, if we ‘bet on an infinite humanity’ 
then we are justified in sacrificing a number of generations to that end.  Essen131 -
tially it is the question of progress and order again. Sartre’s basic claim has always 
been that these are only relative to a particular project - even though that project 
could be a common one. The only other option is that progress and order would be 
inherent in an absolute project that is already given within single transcendent 
consciousness - God’s for example or in the ‘unity of the Spirit’ in the Hegelian 
sense. All of this brings Sartre directly back to freedom. Everything returns to the 
fact that we are situated freedoms. We preserve in surpassing what we are and 
surpass by preserving. His point has always been that the content or the material 
of freedom is always its exterior or its facticity but its action is always its surpass-
ing interiorisation.  This action in turn, of course, creates a further situation which 132
must itself be surpassed and also preserved. In one sense, we have arrived at the 
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basic ontological structure that makes ethics both so natural for him and so, we 
might say, ‘ontically' difficult. As he says in the Cahiers, ‘there is something true in 
an ethics that places the greatness of man in his acceptance of the inevitable and 
of destiny.’ But - ‘I am perpetually condemned to will what I did not will, not to will 
what I willed, to reconstruct myself in terms of the unity of a life in the presence of 
the destructions that are inflicted on me from the exterior.’ There is always a dia-
lectic of spontaneity and facticity: ‘Thus I can never rest - always transformed, un-
dermined, flattened out, overthrown from the outside, yet always free, always 
obliged to take things up again, to take responsibility for what I am not responsible 
for.’  Additionally we might add that - on the assumption that history gets made 133
by situated and temporal individuals and not by some supra-organism or some 
non-temporal subject - this is already the core of an historical agent. 
The problem he faces is what it has always been: how to bring the individ-
ual within the scope of history whilst also preserving the basic value of freedom. In 
this respect what counts is the problem of the ‘internal unity of the group’. As he 
puts it here,’ a historical group can only act given a certain degree of concentra-
tion, of integration, and of self-consciousness.’  In the light of his later focus on 134
the ‘historical ensemble’ what Sartre has to say here about the group and the his-
torical event is significant. If we take, as he does, the example of a group event 
like a strike then the problem of unity is tied up with what will later becomes the 
‘mediating third’. Here Sartre suggests that any third element that totalises will al-
ways remain outside the totalisation. This is a feature of retaining the structure of 
the ‘look’ which necessarily must operate from the exterior. Yet it is also clear that 
the group or the event has a certain kind of inward, dialectical unity which Sartre 
calls here ‘the otherness of immanence’.  Essentially we have here the problem 135
of the ‘quasi-dialectic’ of interiority and exteriority and the detotalised-totality once 
more. The strike ‘is a subjective/objective phenomenon’.  Subjective in the sense 136
that ‘I make it exist through my project’ but objective in the sense that ‘I am inside 
it like an objective unity made by the strike.’  The unity of the strike is not a mo137 -
ment within a Hegelian absolute subject but a series of ‘quasi-totalities’ or a shift-
ing process of de- and re-totalisation as others surpass the strike towards their 
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own ends. Sartre calls this ‘a dialectic with holes in it.’  The consequence of all 138
this for humanity and history is that ‘the dialectic, which has meaning only within 
the perspective of some totality, resolves itself into a plurality of dialectics.’  His139 -
tory, ‘is dialectical, the surpassing of the dialectic, and the interference of between 
dialectic and its surpassing’. The problem then is how far there will always be ‘an 
unsurpassable relation of exteriority’ between one freedom and another’.  Fur140 -
thermore, how far can ‘the total society of the future’ be the goal of freedom and 
the end of History? Needless to say, these issues are the basis of his analysis in 
the Critique. Here, in the Cahiers, he takes issue with Hegel for already assuming 
that History is finite which produces a History ‘turned towards the past’ where each 
past moment is conditioned by the absolute necessity of the present moment. His 
criticism is that this is ‘dead’ history not active ‘historialisation’. As far a Sartre is 
concerned, historialisation is the creative surpassing of the current moment and all 
it contains towards the future in ‘ignorance, risk and uncertainty’. If we are indeed 
dealing with ‘totalities’ and not ‘a totality’ then ‘this life of incertitude becomes an 
absolute’; it is the ‘absolute of actual experience’ and historical action can neither 
vindicate the past nor bind the future.  141
Yet, as Sartre repeatedly asserts, there is a history and we must choose. 
He has already shown a certain kind of process at work in History, albeit a rather 
discouraging one: ‘alienation - negation of alienation - new alienation.’  But we 142
have also seen that, under certain conditions, non-alienated inter-subjective rela-
tions are possible. In fact, one of Sartre’s major points has been that the ‘ethical’ 
as such operates beyond the cycle of alienation. Or rather, that the conversion to 
the attitude of reciprocal freedom - which is simultaneously a self-understanding, 
an understanding of the other and a practical orientation (after all the gift is given 
and created) - breaks it apart. This is the moment of the ‘apocalypse’. In one 
sense everything remains the same - there is still facticity, we are still finite, there 
is still work to be done, we are still mediated by worked matter etc. - but in another 
everything is different. All relationships are conditioned by and all activity under-
taken in the context of a reciprocity of freedoms. This is indeed the ‘Realm of 
Ends’. However, one of Sartre’s many merits as an ethicist is that he sees that the 
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necessary conversion to reciprocal freedom cannot be achieved in abstraction 
from the situation. Equally, he sees that this is not something we can do alone. All 
of which points to the intimate connection between History and Ethics.
It is clear that the motivation to conversion has an ontological basis in the 
‘perpetual failure of the for-itself’s attempt to be’ and the oppressed can always 
become aware of ‘himself as the foundation of every system of oppression’. It is, 143
however, the encounter with the other that motivates this experience and this is 
always concrete and situated. ‘Comprehension’ as the means of accessing the 
subjectivity of the other already presupposes that we are in a world of disparate 
and potentially common projects and that we share what Sartre calls elsewhere, ‘a 
similarity of condition’. The supreme value of subjectivity, Sartre tells us, is ‘gen-
erosity’.  The key feature of generosity is that I freely accept that my facticity be 144
used as means to achieve the free ends of the other as we saw in the develop-
ment of the intersubjective structure of the appeal. Recognition of the other in con-
version is recognition of them as free means and end. They become the value of 
my project because I will it through them. In this way, the authentic man never pur-
sues ‘ “the good of humanity,” but rather in such and such particular circum-
stances, with such and such means, at such and such historical conjuncture, the 
liberation or the development of such and such concrete group.’  Generosity is 145
therefore the evaluative attitude that reveals ‘like a light…freedom properly speak-
ing.’  146
Notebook II tails off with a consideration of ‘creation’ which well illustrates 
the way in which the overall scope of Sartre’s thinking in the text moves away from 
the ontology of Being and Nothingness towards an expanded social ontology. On 
the one hand we have the ‘vicious circle’ of the original project to found myself as 
a necessary being on the basis of my own contingency - on this individual level, 
the ‘relation of one consciousness to the world founders..’, we are condemned to 
failure. On the other hand, ‘as soon as there is a plurality of consciousnesses the 
accent shifts.’ In the context of the detotalised-totality, ‘it is always to others that I 
am necessary’.  Yet the problem remains that I cannot found my necessity on my 147
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necessity for another contingent being!  He seems to be suggesting that we 148
need to modify our understanding of ‘creation’. ‘Man creates for man’ by means of 
the ‘project’ - and crucially we are talking here about the concrete project of work-
ing on the world.  The relation between ‘Being’ and the ‘Project’ needs to be re149 -
versed. ‘It is not Being that has become being/project, rather it is the project, the 
way in which the existent exists, that has become project/being.’ It is an ‘idea re-
alised in being’. We create ‘significations’ which reflect the entirety of society and 
its relations.  What he is describing here is, in effect, a totalising praxis. Yet 150
everything retains the structure of alienation - ‘My idea takes on being, closes in 
on me, escapes me, becomes public.’  It becomes, in a word, historical. Here we 151
are already in the territory of the Critique. 
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Hope Then - Morality and History  1965
In Morality and History, Sartre attempts a regressive/progressive analysis of 
‘the curious dialectic of the Ethical and the Historical.’ The ontological categories 
and concepts are directly those of the Critique but his treatment takes up and, to 
some extent completes, the themes already adumbrated in the Cahiers.  At the 
most superficial level of investigation we find that ‘the imperative arises every-
where’ .  He uses a range of examples to suggest that whether we find the impera1 -
tive in the news media or the advertising industry or, indeed, in the various cultural 
and social exhortations and interdictions we encounter in everyday life, every im-
perative presents itself ultimately as categorical. What he means by this becomes 
increasingly clear as the text develops but for the moment the notion is that, once 
we move from the abstract to the concrete level of the normative, the context - 
from which the hypothetical derives - is already assumed and the norm commands 
categorically. From the perspective of his social ontology, it appears that the nor-
mative is the mediating force in the dialectical development of serial collectives 
and fused groups. In other words, ‘to live in a community is to live under a norma-
tive pressure and to contribute directly (group) or individually (series) to imposing 
that pressure on others.’2
However, the regressive investigation demands that the action of the ‘moral 
norm’ as a ‘specific factor’ be demonstrated. His essential point is that, whilst it 
may well be the case that the normative appears as a structure of our experience 
as social beings, does it have the capacity to produce ‘real determinations’ at the 
most basic level of history? In this way, Sartre launches into his investigation of the 
potential dialectical relation between Morality and History. He embarks on this 
through the famous discussion of Kennedy and West-Virginia. We will not dwell on 
this in any detail here simply because it is well-known and indeed only the begin-
ning of the investigation. Sartre uses the example to suggest that we have here ‘a 
curious dialectic’ of the ‘political and the normative’. Fundamentally, Sartre’s pur-
pose is to show that Kennedy, in his political praxis, shifts to another level of ac-
J. P. Sartre, Morale et Histoire, in Les Temps Modernes, Numbers 632-633-634, July/Oc1 -
tober 2005. (Paris 2006) - p.274  ( All translations are my own.) 
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tion. As a Catholic, in presenting himself to the Democratic electors in the primary 
as an ethical demand for tolerance, he moves beyond simply offering a practical 
programme of concrete solutions to the socio-economic problems of the state to 
the level of what Sartre comes to refer to as ‘Ethos’. He turns himself into what 
Sartre calls, ‘L’homme de l’exigence’ (The man of the demand). He makes the 
race for the Democratic candidature about a single question - will there be toler-
ance or not?  Furthermore, he transforms himself into the incarnation of the ‘un3 -
conditional demand’ that tolerance be the meaning (sens) of their choice. In the 
unconditional demand at the level of Ethos, Sartre sees an appeal to overcome all 
the actual conditions- historical, socio-economic, personal etc. - which might oth-
erwise condition the choice. The ethical demand/appeal is an invitation to deter-
mine the choice solely on the basis of the future as tolerance.  In the uncondition4 -
ality of the demand and the response to it, Sartre sees ‘invention’ on all sides be-
hind which lies freedom. In so far as Kennedy ‘invents’ himself as the ethical de-
mand he posits a hierarchy of values and by the normative choice ‘the agent re-
alises who he is the moment that he separates himself from being to produce him-
self in freedom’.  Of course, politics still exists and the ethical choice is still politi5 -
cal. The ‘curiosity' of the dialectic between ethics and politics lies in the fact that it 
is only by moving to the ethical level that the political end is achieved and it is only 
through a political expression that the ethical end is attained. 
In this way, Sartre introduces the basic structure of the relation between 
what he comes to call the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure future’. Everything comes down to 
the way in which our situated facticity in its widest sense conditions our choice or 
not. The pure future represents the ‘ethical absolute - that is to say the moment 
when the historical agent denies their conditioning’.  Yet Sartre is careful to point 6
out that any historical agent is always in a dialectical relation to their wider situa-
tion. In his terms these are relations of interiority/exteriority. This leaves plenty of 
scope for the absolute choice of the pure, unconditioned future to be diverted and 
‘mystified’ as it ‘falls back into history’ as part of the wider totalisation within the 
historical ensemble. The absolute choice of tolerance itself finds an exterior limit 
given the contemporary conditions of society and their historical depth. In this 
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case, Sartre claims that the ‘formal’ end of the choice of ‘tolerance’ is a ‘type of 
human relations…of unconditional reciprocity’ yet the agent has already ‘interi-
orised’ an ‘exterior limit’ which prevents the practical extension of reciprocity to 
racial minorities, for example.  In other words, the unconditioned choice is still to 7
that extent conditioned by the practico-inert and the socio-economic structure. In 
fact, the choice of the ethical absolute can even operate as a conservative force in 
that by demonstrating that the conditions can be ‘formally surpassed’ at any time 
by an act of ‘moral will’ the underlying facts of oppression can remain largely as 
they were.  8
Sartre certainly feels he has shown that ‘ethics is a specific factor in history’ 
but also that history, to some extent, is ‘made against ethics’. The task remains, 
however, of determining at which level of historical reality ethics is capable of op-
erating and to what extent.  To support this he sets out an interesting and percep9 -
tive phenomenological investigation of the different forms under which the ‘norm’ 
can appear. This cannot detain us here since, although the norm ‘can appear in 
many ways’, every appearance of the normative in whatever guise shares a com-
mon basis. This is that norms ‘propose determinate ends for human conduct and 
present the attainment of these ends as unconditionally possible.’ It is the ‘uncon-
ditional possibility’ that needs to be investigated all the while bearing in mind that 
the possibility only has a meaning in so far as we must realise some ‘rigorously 
defined’ conduct. What interests Sartre is how an unconditional possibility can ap-
pear in a ‘historical world where every possibility for action seems to be rigorously 
conditioned by the state of the practical field and the practico-inert.’  The task 10
then is to show how the unconditional possibility can have a real historical impact. 
He uses the example of a survey of schoolgirls whose answers imply that they 
both lie and uphold, in the abstract at least through their absolute condemnation of 
lying, the categorical imperative of telling the truth. He begins to make a distinction 
between what he calls ‘moral casuistry’ and ‘ethical radicalism’.  In so far as 11
norms operate as ‘indices of integration’ within historical ensembles there is a ten-
dency to operate at the level of ‘casuistry’ simply because a radical ethic of un-
conditionality can threaten the integrity of the group. Casuistry is ‘a morality of lim-
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ited circumstances' which is designed to make relations ‘liveable’.  Casuistry, 12
therefore, is an attempt ‘to condition the unconditional’ by adapting it to the con-
crete and historical context in which the norm is applied. It is not that the radical 
level of the unconditioned possibility disappears - it is simply that we operate on 
both levels and uphold the unconditional which remains a permanent possibility of 
our ethical praxis whilst living out a compromise between values which serves to 
cover over their ethical contradictions as unconditional ends. 
This ethical compromise operates at all levels. The social ensemble as a 
whole integrates ‘partial ensembles in the course of development’ by conditioning 
the norms rather than accepting radical change.  Individuals, in so far as they be13 -
long to different ensembles at different levels of their social existence, must also 
live according to ‘several ethical systems at once.’  In so far as these compromis14 -
es can be sustained, we live within what Sartre calls a condition of ‘moral 
comfort’.  Any shift in our situation can quickly disrupt this comfort and reveal the 15
radical purity of the ultimately unconditional basis of ethics and its scope. Sartre 
uses the example of a young couple where the husband must decide whether to 
lie to his wife about her terminal condition of which she remains ignorant. Sartre 
entangles the young man within a complex interplay of values and imperatives full 
of contradictions and reversals. In refusing the imperative to tell her the truth, the 
husband in one sense develops an ethical stance based on an ‘ideal humanism’ 
which his ‘affectivity’ reveals.  At the level of the couple a certain kind of ‘historical 16
production of human relations’ is being lived out which indicates that one should 
not ‘reduce another human being to despair’ and also, of course, a certain kind of 
response to the particular historical situation the couple are in which had previous-
ly been lived in ‘moral comfort’.  The moral radicalism of the unconditional de17 -
mand to tell her the truth threatens to overturn all this. Yet the decision to lie to her 
- the refusal of ethical radicalism - swiftly turns ‘humanism’ into ‘inhumanity’. By 
lying to her he has reduced her to an object and denies her the ‘chance of a prac-
tical totalisation’ of her own life.  Moreover the lie now demands strange kind of 18
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moral commitment of its own to continue lying despite the temptations to tell the 
truth - the ‘situation is lived in moral uneasiness’. The possibility of opting for the 
radical path ‘of realising the ethical possibility of integral sincerity’ remains at any 
moment but it requires an ‘invention’ that goes beyond the conditions towards the 
unconditional.19
All this obviously requires Sartre to address the relationship between ‘inven-
tion’, ‘conditions’ and the ‘unconditional’. He does this through an examination of 
the structure of praxis itself. Praxis is marked by the dialectical unity of means and 
end. It temporalises itself as a totalisation ‘en cours’. Its objective presents itself as 
the totalisation of the means and demands some kind of work on the world. In so 
far as the objective of praxis ‘absorbs human labour’ it appears as ‘interiority exte-
riorised’ and reflects the activity of the agent as ‘a passive unity of an exterior en-
semble’. This is the practico-inert, Sartre tells us.  The ends at which praxis aims 20
arise through need and desire and reveal the practical field as containing non-be-
ing ‘to be brought into being’ through the ‘lines of possibility’ the practical field con-
tains. Action is a response to what Sartre here calls, ‘une impossibilité de fait’, by 
which he means that the completion of the action, however simple, involves some 
kind of intentional ‘destructuration and restructuration’ of the practical field.  In ef21 -
fect what Sartre does is to define ‘invention’ and ‘condition’ in particular ways so 
that ‘invention’ becomes a fundamental feature of praxis which ‘invents’ a new uni-
ty of the practical field by the ‘transformation of the impossible into possibility by 
the modification of the present conditions of possibility starting from the end to be 
realised.’  ‘Condition’ then becomes that feature of the practical field that can ei22 -
ther be surpassed towards the end through restructuration or that cannot - in 
which case praxis discovers its ‘internal limit of exteriority’.  At this point praxis 23
must either ‘reaffirm the unconditioned end’ by proceeding to further restructura-
tion or proceed to a new invention entirely. The end, considered purely as end, 
remains unconditional!  Superficially it might seem that Sartre has conjured away 24
the ‘conditioning’ by a kind of sleight of hand. Indeed, a consequence of what he 
has to say is that praxis itself is defined in relation to its conditions - ‘The motion of 
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praxis is to pose itself as unconditionally possible and to unveil from there its con-
ditions of possibility’  - but, in so far as it is also an unconditional end, it remains 
what it is as ‘being which ought to be’.  We need to remember that, in this con25 -
text, Sartre is in the ‘regressive’ phase of his investigation. Essentially, the purpose 
is to uncover the basic ontological structures in their ‘purity’. What he thinks he has 
uncovered is a dialectic of the unconditional and its ‘conditions of possibility’. Prax-
is as invention of itself in the unconditional end structures itself as ‘a hierarchical 
and temporalising relation of means’ and in so far as it uncovers its own conditions 
of possibility by positing the end ‘unconditionally’ it creates the practical and tem-
poral field which otherwise would just have inert being in what Sartre calls the ‘in-
ertia of indifference’.  In so far as this is so, it allows Sartre to claim that ‘Every26 -
thing happens as if praxis - whatever its objective - affirms itself ethically and finds 
itself historically.’  This is crucial to the progress of Sartre’s investigation and im27 -
plies that praxis - which is now his primary term for the activity of freedom in the 
world - always contains an element of unconditionality and therefore of the ethical. 
Equally, it always discovers its ‘conditions of possibility’ within the temporal field of 
the world as potential means. This plunges the free praxis back into History. 
This means that Sartre now needs to consider in more detail the relation-
ship between free praxis and its historicality as he is now defining it. This allows 
Sartre to bring into play the entire diachronic structure of totalisation and de-totali-
sation which includes all the features of his developed ontology from the Critique. 
‘The past of the historical agent’, ‘the material givens’ such as ‘scarcity’, the 
‘worked matter’ and the ‘action of others’. This is the dialectical relation between 
interiority and exteriority that underlies his thinking; it is a perpetual process of in-
tegration and disintegration.  In an important passage Sartre illustrates how he 28
thinks this reveals a key feature of our historical existence. ‘The exterior as a 
whole ends up passing through (traverser) the interior and by becoming its limit 
and, in so far even as it is worked matter, the universe of inert resistance tends to 
scatter the practical unity or divert it insensibly: Without the appropriate means, if 
the agent is not careful, the pursued end will be substituted by the end of the 
means that he has.’  This ‘action of the means’ is a key part of how Sartre charac29 -
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terises the paradoxical situation of free praxis in the world. He frequently uses the 
example of some kind of external perspective on the operation of a free praxis as it 
releases a cascade of counter forces which divert and potentially destroy its end. 
In this case he uses the example of the car driver who unwittingly attempts to drive 
across a weakened bridge - but the context of the ‘trap’, the ‘ruse’ and the ‘disas-
ter’ allows him to illustrate what he calls ‘praxis process’.  His point is that our free 30
praxis is always conditioned by the very conditions it must employ to realise itself. 
Even at the very simple level of the driver on the bridge, the free praxis can be 
seen both as the operation of freedom and the unfolding of an exterior ‘fate’ and 
‘destiny’.  In this way our praxis returns to us through the exterior medium of the 31
inert as ‘counter-finality’ - the fundamental principle remains the same whether we 
are talking about the material weakness of the bridge or the complexities of the 
‘worked matter’ of the practico-inert field more widely considered. Praxis always 
brings about and reveals its own conditions which can then return to it as counter-
praxis. In this way, Sartre tells us, destiny reflects ‘that necessity for a praxis to re-
alise the conditioning of man as the future result of a freedom which posits, by in-
ertia, its end as unconditioned’. Yet, to the extent that the future of praxis never 
simply appears as a ‘simple future state of phenomena in exteriority’ but as 
‘counter-praxis’, then that future is never neutrally ‘a-human’ but negatively ‘inhu-
man’.  Ultimately, this is the ‘ruse’ and the ‘trap’ of History. As Sartre puts it here, 32
‘this can put forward an image of man that is often discouraging.’!33
So far, Sartre thinks that he has shown that ‘ethos’ is possible dialectically 
since it is ‘the moment when freedom attains itself before losing and alienating it-
self in objectivisation.’ From the side of praxis there is certainly an attempt to ‘con-
dition its conditions’ and give itself ‘a moment of absolute power to submit the 
world to human beings’, it is thus an ‘affirmation of human capacity.’  What is in 34
question is how far ‘ethos’ can operate as the ‘refusal of the trap of history’. Given 
that we are already and always in history our ethical praxis will be a response to 
and conditioned by our historical situation. Our inventions will reflect what Sartre 
calls the ‘heuristic liberty’ to invent practical solutions to specific problems based 
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on the conditions of past praxis and our facticity.  To address this Sartre develops 35
the distinction between the ‘pure’ and the ‘impure’ future. As we have seen, every-
thing comes down to how free praxis relates to its conditions. Through a series of 
examples drawn from the experience of tortured resistance fighters during the oc-
cupation Sartre attempts to show how the ‘unconditioned reveals its true temporal 
dimension’.  Under the extreme conditions of a subject facing torture all ‘condi36 -
tions’ themselves become ‘deconditioned’ by the absolute end of remaining silent 
under torture. Sartre recognises that the resistance fighter is part of a larger histor-
ical ensemble but his purpose is to show that, at the limit, the agent can only main-
tain their silence by inventing themselves as ‘pure subject of interiority’ by surpass-
ing all conditions, including their own facticity, as means toward the end that they 
posit in the ‘pure future’. In such a way, Sartre thinks that the ‘pure future’ reveals 
the possibility of ‘conditioning the past by the future through the present.’ Ethical 37
radicalism is the invention of ourselves as subjects of interiority through ‘a restruc-
turation of the practical field by putting our facticity in question’ . Through the up38 -
holding of the unconditional end, Sartre claims we can ‘effect a rupture of contact 
with being (that’s to say being-past) and return to it to take it up again in the con-
text of the norm.’  The choice of the pure future is therefore a totalisation of the en-
tire temporal structure of our existence which acts ‘contrary to destiny’ in that, by 
reconditioning the givens of the practical field, we can ‘give the given another 
meaning (sens)’  39
Sartre’s investigation has therefore revealed two levels or regions of praxis, 
both defined in terms of their temporal structure as totalisations and the way in 
which they relate to their conditions defined as the state of the practical field from 
which and through which these praxes operate. Essentially, ‘historical praxis’ op-
erates as an ‘heuristic invention’ conditioned by its conditions as past being - it is 
the exterior passing through the interior and, to that extent is subsumed by praxis-
process and ‘destiny’. It works towards an ‘impure future’ which is conditioned by 
its past.  The moment of radical ethical praxis is the moment of the ‘absolute in40 -
vention’ of oneself as ‘pure subject of interiority’, it aims at the realisation of an ab-
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solutely unconditional end which is posited in a pure future which is thus not condi-
tioned by its past and present conditions. In holding to the end ‘unconditionally’ the 
agent ‘destructures’ the entire practico-temporal field and restructures it as means 
to be surpassed toward the absolute end. One consequence of this, Sartre thinks, 
is that the outcomes of ‘heuristic’, historical praxis are ‘foreseeable’. He means this 
in the sense that, if the end and its realisation are conditioned by their conditions, 
then we can talk in terms of how the operation of the exterior conditions on our in-
teriority make a particular result more or less likely. He sees this as a certain kind 
of historical ‘comprehension’.  If, on the other hand, the moment of pure invention 41
as subject of interiority is an absolute conditioning of its conditions, then the reali-
sation of the end cannot be extrapolated from its historical conditions. In so far as 
all conditions become surpassable means to the end then, for that moment at 
least, the deepest aspects of our facticity are destructured and reconstituted as 
means. In terms of the extreme examples he uses to illustrate this, the ‘twin poles’ 
of our facticity - birth and death - themselves can be surpassed in totalising our 
lives as the means to realising an unconditional end.  The resistance fighter 42
chooses suicide rather than talk under torture or the concentration camp inmates 
uphold the unconditional end of life itself by maintaining ‘bare life itself’ even when 
life is conditioned such that it contains no ‘good’.  43
Sartre thinks that these extreme occasions where ‘the historical agent faces 
the moment of invention’ reveal the particular character of radical ethical praxis. 
The attempt at the realisation of an ethical end, posited in the pure future, is ‘com-
prehensible’ - it has determinate content, it aims at something and there is a com-
prehensible relation of means and end - but it is not foreseeable in the sense that 
historical praxis, considered in itself, is. This, of course, is because the realisation 
of the unconditional ethical end is not a function of its ‘probability’ based on its an-
terior conditions - the anterior inertia of the statistical fact that ‘most people hold 
out for 24 hours before speaking’ or even the inertia of the fact that the individual 
held out yesterday cannot condition the absolute commitment to holding out 
‘now’.  As we have seen, the structure of the absolute praxis of the unconditional 44
end is that the future conditions the past and the present. Sartre is careful to point 
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out that it is not that no ‘means’ come to us from the past to support the end - so 
for example, we may have been trained to resist torture or we may have engaged 
ourselves within the ensemble to remain silent through the ‘pledge’ (serment) - his 
point is rather that, if every aspect of our condition can serve as means and be 
surpassed towards the ‘pure future’, then the realisation of the unconditional end is 
not foreseeable or analysable as an object of knowledge (un savoir).  45
Once again, we need to remember that we are at the regressive level of the 
investigation here. Sartre is attempting to show that ‘the ethical dimension is a real 
structure of praxis’.  In so far as he defines history as the total structure of all an46 -
terior conditions, then radical ethical praxis has an interesting and paradoxical re-
lation to its past. The radical ethical praxis is clearly a response of a certain kind to 
its historical situation. If the agent responds to their historical condition by pushing 
to the limit the conflict between ‘an absolute conditioning in exteriority’ and ‘the 
ethical destruction of facticity’ then Sartre sees at work both the operation of free-
dom as the ‘pure praxis’ of the invention of oneself as ‘subject of interiority’ and the 
operation of the historical conditions as what is surpassed towards the end. In in-
venting themselves as the subject of an ethical praxis, Sartre points out that we 
are also acting historically. For example, we can only attain the historical end of 
maintaining the resistance group and its politico-historical goals by operating at 
ethical level of the unconditional end of remaining silent.  Sartre sees this reveal47 -
ing the ‘curious dialectic’ of ethics and history. The danger remains that by invent-
ing ourselves as a ‘subject of interiority’ the moment of freedom and transcen-
dence remains, as it were, on the side of the agent. As our free praxis must nec-
essarily pass over into the practico-inert and return to us as ‘the other’ if it is to 
have some kind of historical efficacy, we thereby become the ‘subject/object’ of 
history once again. This is the heart of the ‘ethical paradox’ whereby the moment 
of freedom is real as, of course, are the historical conditions and the action of the 
‘other’. The paradox reduces to the point that whilst ethical praxis conditions its 
conditions, it is in turn conditioned by them. In other words, radical ethical praxis 
seeks to act outside of history, simply because it transcends all its anterior condi-
tions towards the unconditional end, but at the same time it seeks to realise itself 
historically by restructuring the practical field, whatever its historical configuration 
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might be. The paradox stems from the fact that we posit an ethical end that we can 
only reach historically, yet at the same time the ethical end remains unconditional 
in the sense that it seeks to give history another ‘meaning’.
We have here the possibility of what Sartre refers to as an ‘ethical pes-
simism’ and an ‘ethical optimism’. Everything comes down to how far the ethical 
praxis can condition its conditions. Pessimism is simply the conclusion that the 
ethical is a real structure of praxis but, since it posits its ends unconditionally, it 
can fail historically, which is also to say practically. The ethical norm retains its un-
conditionality as a permanent, unforeseeable possibility but, in so far as it is ‘not 
sustained by the real determinations of the practical field’, the norm appears to ex-
ist only ‘to be mocked (bafouer) and to mock (bafouer) us ceaselessly in turn by 
denouncing our real status as sub-human through the possibility without condition 
of making ourselves human, which is to say our incapacity de fait [practical], al-
ways revocable, never revoked, to surpass the exteriority interiorised, the totalisa-
tion detotalised, the unity disintegrated, the future-fate, in short our historical con-
dition as subjects-objects.’  A key part of Sartre’s point here is that ethical praxis 48
potentially shares the fate of all praxis because its structure is fundamentally the 
same. What begins as invention by a ‘subject of interiority’ and an attempt to con-
dition its conditions becomes a series of increasingly alienating and diverting com-
promises with the practico-inert, the action of which has, of course, been called 
into being by praxis itself. We are once again in the grip of praxis-process and the 
‘exterior is introduced into the interior’ and ‘ethics appears as a ruse of history’.  49
Yet there is the possibility of optimism which again stems from the structure of 
praxis itself. At the heart of all praxis is the moment of invention and, even as the 
ethical end is absorbed into history, the agent can ‘posit the vocation of praxis to 
unconditionality: that is to say that the agent discovers the meaning (sens) of the 
action, which is the subjection of the world to man without reciprocity. This mean-
ing, even though it dissolves into history, which is partially non-meaning (non-
sens), remains as the indispensable affirmation of praxis by itself even in failure 
(échec).’  The optimism lies, Sartre thinks, in the way in which we might see ethi50 -
cal praxis therefore not just as positing an unconditional end and either finding its 
realisation immediately or ‘against and through history - by an infinite progression.’ 
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Sartre is referring here to what he calls, ‘a circularity of reorganisations’ of the 
practical field. However if we focus, Sartre thinks, on the moment of invention it51 -
self, we can see the possibility of what he calls ‘pure praxis’. This is a praxis that 
totalises itself by taking its own unconditionality as an integral part of its end. As he 
puts it, ‘there are ends which reveal themselves as only being attainable by a pure 
praxis, this defines its ethical moment.’  Central to this is the way in which the 52
ends pure praxis puts forward are ‘selective’, they ‘reduce praxis to its ethical mo-
ment’ by ‘refusing to envisage the historical consequences of the action they call 
for.’  In this way it posits its own unconditionality as unconditional. The ends of 53
pure praxis ‘by their demand itself, posit that such praxis is possible and that the 
historical agent can always escape their condition as subject-object to make them-
selves subject of interiority.’  Sartre thinks that we can see here the ‘eidos’ of pure 54
praxis. The ‘eidos’ of pure praxis is precisely the unconditional and permanent  
possibility of inventing ourselves at any moment as subjects of interiority and not 
objects of history.55
At this stage, Sartre points out, we can say little about the content and real 
effect of these ends of pure praxis. It may be that they are just one more ‘ruse of 
history’. It may also be that they ‘can come to light across all historical ends as 
their true meaning’. What we can say is that in the radical ethical moment of pure 
praxis we can see an implicit demand for a ‘total transformation’ of ourselves as 
practical agents and our relation to the world and other agents.’  The fundamental 56
issue remains a matter of where we are to place the real significance and efficacy 
of ethical praxis. To address this Sartre needs to move from the ‘abstract structure’ 
of ethical praxis and consider the concrete historical conditions within which ethical 
praxis operates. Here the relation between ethics and history can appear in a 
number of forms. Certainly as ‘subjects of interiority’ ethics can be simply what is 
left to us when our historical action fails. ‘Interiority remains the refuge’ and we can 
exhibit a certain kind of ‘ethical heroism’ and thereby achieve a kind of ethical tri-
umph through historical failure.  This is a theme Sartre returns to but here he also 57
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raises the question of what ends justify placing our ‘facticity’ unconditionally at risk. 
From one perspective he notes, the kind of ethical radicalism that puts everything 
at risk is itself a challenge to the existing normative structures which hold together 
the historical ensembles within which we exist. In so far we are within these nor-
mative structures we relate to the various manifestations of the ‘norm’ het-
eronomously and, to that extent, inauthentically. This is Sartre’s characterisation of 
the normative as the ‘other in me’. Imperatives, for example, appear as the ends 
for which we are the means.  Ultimately we are in some way ‘objectively desig58 -
nated’ by the norms and they appear to us as ‘tasks’. Yet at the same time ethical 
radicalism remains a permanent feature and possibility of praxis.  Ethical radical59 -
ism can reappear at those moments of extreme historical challenge when the en-
semble faces ‘disintegration’; but we live, for the most part, in normative cycles of 
‘repetition’ and ‘exis’. At the level of the social ensemble, Sartre tells us, our nor-
mative structure is a ‘nest of contradictions’.60
Normative maxims are diverse both historically and within the same society, 
he says. To that extent they must be ‘historically conditioned’.  Yet they all de61 -
mand the same structure of unconditional praxis. Secondly, historical societies 
must in some way move forward normatively. New values appear through the evo-
lution at the deep level of society and its structures. Yet, these values tend to sta-
bilise and form a repetitive normative system which, in so far as it is dialectically 
linked to the material and social conditions of that society, operate as uncondition-
al normative support for those social conditions. Given, Sartre claims, that the 
hegemony - in the Gramscian sense - of the dominant class is never total and that 
the material conditions of society are also in evolution then there are always con-
testations of the dominant normative structure.  Ultimately, Sartre thinks, the dom62 -
inant ethic must prescribe a kind of permanence onto the underlying processes of 
evolution. The dominant ethic cannot ‘recognise pluralism’ and, although it can 
adapt to some extent through ‘casuistry’, it must eventually break. In this way, 
Sartre thinks that any dominant ethics is already ‘expired’(périmé)-  it is always 
behind the real evolution of society.  Moreover, its attempt to define the normative 63
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space forces the ethical challenge of the dominated class to present itself both as 
an ‘ethical demand’ and ‘not just the radical negation of the dominant ethics but of 
all ethics’.  Yet the ‘radicals’ remain for all that in an ‘ethico-historical' bind. 64
The way Sartre presents this is interesting. It seems as if the ethical radical 
cannot escape a certain kind of repetition. If they attempt to break free from history 
by inventing themselves as subject of interiority they must aim at an end outside of 
history. But the only way they can do this is by reconditioning the past. To do this 
they must draw on the available range of values considered historically. In other 
words, they must repurpose, as it were, the normative system of prior societies 
with a different historical condition to their own. This seems to be the most plausi-
ble interpretation of what Sartre means by his statement that, ‘in making them-
selves ethical, the historical agent determines themselves according to a pure fu-
ture which is precisely the social past.’  He gives the example of reluctant bour65 -
geois revolutionaries of 1789 who invented themselves as classical heroes with 
the ‘intention of transforming history into a normative order’.  The aspect of para66 -
dox derives from what Sartre terms the ‘supra-historicity’ of the praxis ‘in its full 
development’ and the ‘hyper-historicity’ since history itself is the basis of the prax-
is. His basic point is that you cannot reduce the paradox of ethics by either excis-
ing the historical dimension or the radical ethical praxis. It is as if, he says, ‘ethical 
radicalism cannot preserve itself without developing into historical radicalism.’  67
Another way of putting this is to say that whatever norms we have available can be 
the basis of our ethical praxis but then also of our historical agency. Even if the 
norm is a product of the past, its historical action is toward the future. This leads 
Sartre to yet another formulation of the ethical paradox. 
In any particular historical ensemble the norms in operation appear to the 
agents concerned as ‘unsurpassable’.  They have what he calls, ‘a being beyond 68
being’. What he means by this becomes clearer when he claims that our relation to 
the norm as agents is such that all we can do is ‘conform our conduct’ to it though 
the ethical praxis of the ‘pure future’. From this perspective, the norm can never be 
‘realised’ in the sense that it can have ‘an ontic incarnation.’ ‘At this level’, Sartre 69
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writes, ‘the norm presents itself as supra-historical because it manifests itself in 
objectivity as a system of rules which could (unconditional future) if the rules are 
rigorously observed govern the course of history or render it useless (the reduction 
to repetition)without ever being incarnated in history.’  This is their ‘being beyond 70
being’. Yet, the normative systems which appear unsurpassable to the agents that 
live them are also surpassed by the movement of history itself. The evolution of 
society gives rise to competing normative systems and as a particular ‘social en-
semble is challenged, re-absorbed or destroyed by historical forces’ its norms ‘slip 
into the past’.  At the level of history, therefore, it seems as if the attempt ‘to 71
negate history’ ends up reducing the ‘normative ends to passive determinations, 
carried along by history and without a direct action on the historical process.’  72
However, it is also the case that an agent can uphold their normative system 
against history as ‘counter-value’ at exactly the moment that it is being surpassed 
by history.  Sartre thinks that, seen from the exterior, these normative cycles sug73 -
gest ‘ethical relativism’.  However this is just a function of the fact that we observe 74
these norms from the outside and do not live them. From the perspective of life, 
the normative always appears as ‘an absolute which necessitates that other abso-
lute which is the enterprise in interiority or the absolute-subject.’  It is even possi75 -
ble for a particular agent to ‘situate themselves reflexively at a distance from the 
normative ensemble’ and thereby encounter a ‘throng of facts’.  But this perspec76 -
tive only serves to ‘mask’ the radical aspect of the norm, which still remains. 
Sartre’s notes tail off with a shift into the register of ‘Marxist structuralism’.  77
In his remarks which are clearly merely the preliminary to a further development, 
Sartre emphasises that the paradox appears in the form of the relationship be-
tween two modes of ethical transmission. Considered diachronically, as a child we 
receive the ethical norms as ‘ideal’ and later encounter them as ‘mediated by 
worked matter’. He puts this in terms of the ‘parent’ transmitting to the child ‘ideal-
ly’ as ‘an inert interdiction’ that appears to come directly from ‘man’, a normative 
structure that, for the parent, is mediated by and a product of the material condi-
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tions of society and the practico-inert. In this way, the child interiorises the norms 
without yet knowing their ‘meaning’ (sens).  In so far as we are both ‘child and 78
parent’, the ‘other’ as a moral conditioning appears first as ‘ideal’ and then as ‘ma-
terial’. As an adult, the child ‘recognises’ in their historico-material condition what 
they have already internalised as ‘habitus’.  As Sartre puts it, ‘in this way morality, 
diachronically, is a double conditioning…’  The individual ‘is conditioned by same 
reality as son of man and as man.’ Yet history and the material conditions of soci79 -
ety are themselves in movement which can introduce ‘a slight disjunction’ (un 
léger décalage) into the correspondence between ‘these two forms of the same 
imperative. A part of moral “life” stems from this.’  This ambiguity between these 80
two forms of the imperative is where ‘ethics strictly speaking’ can be found. Each 
form of the imperative ‘masks the practico-inert character of the other’, which ap-
pears both as ‘the autonomy of the human will (as intersubjectivity) just as it is a 
rigorous heteronomy.’81
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Conclusion
It should be clear from this presentation of these three ‘moments’ from 
Sartre’s work that his ethical thinking defies a ready and easy ‘totalisation’. Cer-
tainly it can - and has been - periodised in a variety of ways linked ultimately to the 
development of his ontology. The problem with this approach is the same as the 
problem that Sartre himself faced. It is simply that the ontology does not, to say 
the least, directly deliver an ethics. This is, of course, the theme of the notorious 
concluding passages of Being and Nothingness. Yet even at this stage we are al-
ready talking about ‘human reality in situation’. The issue is how far ‘freedom’ can 
‘take itself for an end’ and the relationship between this ontological freedom and its 
conditioned situation.  As we have seen, the Cahiers develops this in a range of 
significant ways. 
Not only is the ‘subjective totality’ of the ‘For-itself’ situated in the dynamic 
context of its historical condition but ‘the other’ can now appear not only as nega-
tion of our freedom but also, potentially, as an affirmation. Intersubjectively, then, 
there is a movement from confrontation to comprehension. But this itself is not 
enough - after all we can ‘comprehend’ the other as threat - there must also be a 
move towards the ethical structure of the ‘appeal’ and ‘the gift’. Within this struc-
ture we can find a certain kind of reciprocity of freedoms and also, it might be said, 
a certain kind of praxis in that the ‘generosity’ that underpins the gift on both sides 
leads to the completion of the ends of the other, as the ends of both, in the con-
crete conditions that give rise to the end. Yet though we have moved forward ethi-
cally we are still at the intra-individual level here. The ends and the reciprocity they 
occasion arise and are realised within the wider conditions of history, are them-
selves conditioned by it and, to the the extent that their realisation produces new 
conditions, make it. In this way, the Cahiers leaves us with hope in the possibility 
of isolated moments of recognition and reciprocity. However, if we place everything 
back into the ‘trough of history’, once more we are in the context of the ‘plurality of 
freedoms’ and the ‘detotalised-totality’. The exercise of authentic, situated freedom 
becomes a ‘risk’ or is conditioned by ends that cease to be its own. Moreover, 
again as we have seen, in so far as Sartre is already in the Cahiers laying out the 
basic foundations of aspects of the practico-inert, our freedom becomes the 
inessential means of its own ends. This is already apparent in the structure of op-
pression. Ontologically our freedom is its source yet materially it conditions our 
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freedom. We live out oppression as if it were simultaneously a choice and a ne-
cessity. The basic problem is that the ‘City of Ends’ is inherent in the appeal and 
the gift but only as ideality not as materiality. In other words it cannot be merely a 
choice of self in relation to another self but a choice of ourselves in the world and a 
choice of the material conditions of that world itself. This inevitably implies a com-
mon praxis towards a common end. In one sense this is encapsulated in what is 
surely a key moment of the Cahiers : We must reverse the project of freedom - it is 
no longer a project to be as for-itself-in-itself but the project to be within our condi-
tions. It is not being that is the end in some total, isolated and static sense, but the 
historical project becomes an end in itself. 
We might say then that the ‘sens’ of the Cahiers is towards an ontological 
investigation of the historical ensemble and the historical event. If, indeed, we are 
all implicated in the structures of oppression, alienation and the practico-inert then 
obviously the only hope we have of changing our condition is through some kind of 
‘conversion to reciprocity’ through which we can develop a common praxis to re-
condition our conditions. Yet the conclusion of the Critique, in so far as it has one, 
is that the ‘pure praxis’ of the group in fusion, just as that of the individual as such, 
will fall back into history. Their praxis will itself be conditioned by the ongoing de-
velopment of the very conditions that they seek to surpass. The basic ethical 
paradox that he highlights appears here. ‘Pure praxis’ like praxis in general invents 
itself ethically yet finds itself historically. Ethics therefore appears both at the level 
of the pure future and at the historically conditioned level of the impure future. 
Sartre’s analysis in Morality and History shows that rather than existing in parallel, 
these two levels of the normative are fundamentally and dialectically entwined. In 
this respect his analysis of the ‘curious dialectic’ of Morality and History is a power-
ful and pertinent one. In so far as politics can be conducted ethically then all the 
contradictions inherent in the paradox are in play. Kennedy invents himself as eth-
ical as a means of operating politically against the background of a historically 
conditioned and structured society yet the radical unconditionality within the ethical 
remains. One wonders what Sartre would have made of the current populist poli-
tics which to some extent or another grip our societies. This politics presents itself 
insistently and categorically as an ethical demand. It can be ‘lived’ by its support-
ers with as much fervour and as absolutely as any other normative system of ends 
- it can produce, therefore, the praxis of ethical radicalism. Yet there is surely at 
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least a possibility that what we have here is the product of ‘mystification’ and ma-
nipulation driven by the underlying socio-historical process. 
One of the great merits of Morality and History is Sartre’s emphasis that the 
normative appears at all levels of our social existence. Equally, society itself, in its 
development, gives rise to values and normative structures which are linked to its 
underlying conditions of development or, as we saw, there is ‘a slight disjunction’ 
between the norms we internalise as children and the normative structure we en-
counter in the conditions of society as adults. There is already scope here for a 
kind of creative interplay of values from within the communities that we inhabit and 
from within our own normative experience as individuals. To some extent we can 
overcome the contradictions between the norms we encounter at different levels 
creatively - to that extent there is always a certain kind of invitation to invent. 
Equally, the contradiction can give rise to ‘casuistry’ and ‘inauthenticity’. Funda-
mentally though Sartre assumes that behind all invention of values is also an in-
vention of our humanity. We are sub-human in so far as our conditions do not al-
low the realisation of our humanity. In so far as the normative structure is itself a 
part of our condition then we are sub-human to the extent that our norms do not 
fully reflect the value of our humanity. Given that the normative structure itself is 
dialectically related to the underlying structures of society then an ‘ethical radical-
ism’ will involve an ‘historical radicalism’. Certainly, one of the attractions of Marx-
ism for Sartre was that it could deliver certain kind of historical radicalism - yet, for 
the Sartre of Hope Now at least, only by reducing the ethical radicalism to a func-
tion of the historical conditions. Ultimately for Sartre the fundamental contradiction 
arises not at the level of the historico-material conditions but at the level of the 
lived experience of the normative. It is not that there is no dialectic but his dialectic 
runs, so to speak, in an opposite orientation. 
There is indeed a ‘slight disjunction’ between our ability to condition the 
conditions and the action of the conditions themselves. If pure praxis is dialectical-
ly possible then we can de-condition the practical field. We can posit our own hu-
manity as subject of interiority unconditionally and this is so simply because the 
totality of our facticity becomes the means to end. Absolutely everything is put at 
risk for the unconditional end. In this way the ‘ethical moment’ is absolute. Yet pre-
cisely because this praxis confines itself to the ‘ethical moment’ it is the absolute 
within the relative. As always, the moment of autonomy passes over into the com-
plex heteronomy of the detotalised-totality, the plurality of freedoms and the practi-
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co-inert. But here, again, we can find hope simply because our own free praxis is 
part of the basis of the practico-inert and the heteronomy and conditioning is never 
total. Obviously then we need a common praxis that is also an ethically radical one 
in that it must seek to condition its conditions unconditionally. If the structure of the 
appeal and the gift at the intra-individual level that Sartre discusses in the Cahiers 
is a genuine feature of our experience, then there is surely some basis for hope 
here too. However, as the Critique so amply illustrates there is a further problem of 
understanding the reciprocity of freedoms at the level of the ‘historical ensemble’. 
Here everything is structured in terms of ‘interests’ which themselves are the prod-
uct of scarcity and the practico-inert field. A key part of the difficulty that the later 
Sartre had with the notion of the proletariat as the universal class was simply that 
however ‘universal’ its interest as a class might be, it is still just one more interest 
within a plurality of interests. The vindication of this interest is just one more way in 
which the ‘whole shitty mess’ can start up again. In this context we need to take 
Sartre’s remarks about a ‘deeper fraternity’ in Hope Now seriously. If this recogni-
tion of a common humanity that lies outside of our historical conditions is possible 
then there is also hope here. 
So, finally, what are we to make of Hope Now and its ‘messianism’? It 
should be clear that what Sartre has to say in Hope Now is, at least, a plausible 
continuation of his ethical thinking as it had developed since the Cahiers. Indeed, 
his remarks in the discussion also provide the basis of an honest and critical self-
assessment of his attempts at an ethics. We have seen that if ‘hope’ means a be-
lief in the possibility of ‘conditioning our conditions’ in the light of some developed 
value of ‘humanity’ then there is scope for it in his thinking. ‘Messianism’ in the 
terms that Sartre is prepared to affirm in Hope Now is, in fact, an appropriate 
metaphor for the ‘ethical paradox' that he has been grappling with all along. It is 
the radical proposition of an end to history that is also a new beginning where 
ethics will condition the totality of human relations through the reciprocal ‘gift’ of 
freedom. It is based both in our immediate experience of each other as sharing a 
common humanity and it is the invention of a ‘historical myth’ which can serve as a 
‘common end’ in the pure future from within the historical conditions of the ‘strug-
gle against scarcity’. The ‘slight disjunction’ between the conditions and our ability 
to condition our conditions is the space through which both ethics and hope ap-
pear. What happens next is up to you and me and all the others. Ethics for Sartre 
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is therefore both the gift of freedom and the risk of freedom in reciprocity and in 
this way it is always and absolutely, hope. 
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